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ABSTRACT
This article addresses the pressing issue of the appropriate use of
social science research by courts in family law decision-making. The
jurisprudence of family law is increasingly influenced by social sci-
ence research. Frequently, social science-based instrumental and
empirical claims, rather than moral ones, are used to justify family
law decisions. In addition, debate about the proper use of social sci-
ence by courts has been spurred on by the United States Supreme
Court's ruling in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals that
makes courts gate-keepers responsible for assessing the validity of
expert scientific testimony.
The article recommends an expansion of the gate-keeping model
and argues that judges should scrutinize not only expert testimony but
other sources of social science as well. Implementing this new model
requires understanding the complex interrelationship among courts'
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modes of access, evaluation, and use of social science. Hence, one
goal of this article is to examine how courts use and access social
science in family law decisions. Another goal is to provide research
evaluation standards to assist users of that research. To accomplish
these goals, the article develops definitions and a typology of uses of
social science by courts and explores how courts access social sci-
ence research. It also proposes standards for judges and others in
assessing and using social science research and provides a set of key
questions to be used in such assessments. The article concludes that
decision-making in family law cases can and should benefit from
social science research, but that judges must take into account the
need to critically evaluate the contribution that such research can
make.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The jurisprudence of family law is increasingly influenced by
social science research. This trend is evidenced in court decisions,'
interdisciplinary conferences,2 multidisciplinary professional organiza-
tions,3 and in major law reform projects such as the American Law Insti-
tute' s thirteen-year development of the Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution.' Frequently, social science-based instrumental and empiri-
cal claims, rather than moral ones, are used to justify family law propos-
als and decisions.5
In addition, debate about the proper use of social science by courts
in general has been spurred on by the United States Supreme Court's
ruling in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals that makes courts
responsible for assessing the validity of expert scientific testimony.6
Under Daubert, courts must ensure "that an expert's testimony both
rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand," conse-
quently placing a greater burden on courts when experts are used.7
1. E.g., Baures v. Lewis, 770 A.2d 214 (N.J. 2001).
2. E.g., Am. Bar Ass'n Family Law Section & The Johnson Found., High-Conflict Custody
Cases: Reforming the System for Children - Conference Report and Action Plan, 34 FAM. L.Q.
589 (2001).
3. E.g., AFCC, Association of Family and Conciliation Courts, ("an international and
interdisciplinary association of family, court, and community professionals dedicated to the
constructive resolution of family disputes") (emphasis in original), at http://afccnet.org/docs/
about.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2004).
4. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLuLTON: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (2002).
5. See, e.g., Lee E. Teitelbaum, Divorce, Custody, Gender, and the Limits of Law: On
Dividing the Child, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1808, 1809 (1994); Carl E. Schneider, On the Duties and
Rights of Parents, 81 VA. L. REV. 2477 (1995).
6. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). For additional discussion of
the Daubert requirements, see infra Part IV. Daubert interpreted the Federal Rules of Evidence,
but because most state evidence rules track the federal rules, the Supreme Court's ruling has been
very influential at both the state and federal levels. See, e.g., Michael J. Saks, The Aftermath of
Daubert: An Evolving Jurisprudence of Expert Evidence, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 229, 230 (2000).
7. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597 (1993). The Court's ruling was based on its interpretation of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, although the Rules were subsequently amended to more closely track
the Court's interpretation. On remand, Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
described this new burden as follows:
Our responsibility, then, unless we badly misread the Supreme Court's opinion, is to
resolve disputes among respected, well-credentialed scientists about matters
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The connection between family law and social science research
raises a number of issues for judges deciding family cases, attorneys
preparing cases, and legal scholars working on law reform. In today's
world, general and unsupported "facts" about families are hard to justify.
A judge would find it difficult, for example, to justify an award of cus-
tody to a mother through the reasoning that "[m]other love is a dominant
trait in even the weakest of women, and as a general thing surpasses the
paternal affection for the common offspring, and, moreover, a child
needs a mother's care even more than a father's."8 However, courts also
receive criticism when they uncritically adopt a theory promulgated by
well-known practitioners in a field, such as the psychological parent the-
ory proposed in Beyond the Best Interests of the Child.9
When judges, attorneys, and policy-makers use social science to
develop their decisions, strategies, and recommendations, they need to
have the capacity to assess social science research and the ability to use
research findings appropriately. Of course, social science does not pro-
vide the definitive answer to a policy question or a proper case out-
come. 1 A policy choice is a normative choice, formed after weighing
competing values and goals. A judge's determination is formed after
consideration of the facts of a case and the applicable law; increasingly,
social science information is playing a role in this evaluation, albeit an
inherently limited role. Understanding this role and assessing social sci-
ence are important components of modern family law jurisprudence.
This article focuses on courts and recommends that judges, when
considering social science in family law matters, broadly employ a gate-
keeping model which scrutinizes not only expert testimony but other
sources of social science as well. Implementing this model requires an
understanding of the complex interrelationship among modes of access,
evaluation, and use. Hence, one goal of this article is to examine how
courts use and access social science in family law decisions. Another
goal is to provide research evaluation standards to assist users of that
research.
To accomplish these goals, Part H provides definitions and a typol-
squarely within their expertise, in areas where there is no scientific consensus as to
what is and what is not "good science," and occasionally to reject such expert
testimony because it was not "derived by the scientific method."
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995).
8. Freeland v. Freeland, 159 P. 698, 699 (Wash. 1916).
9. Peggy C. Davis, 'There is a Book Out. . .': An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of
Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539 (1987) (criticizing courts' use of JOSEPH GOLDSTEiN,
ANNA FREUD, & ALBERT J. SOLNrr, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHLD (1973)).
10. See infra Part IV.B.3.b; see also Sarah H. Ramsey & Robert F. Kelly, Using Social
Science Research in Family Law Analysis and Formation: Problems and Prospects, 3 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 631 (1994).
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ogy of uses of social science by courts. Part III explores how courts
access social science research. Part IV proposes guidelines for judges
and others in assessing and using social science research. The article
concludes that decision-making in family law cases can benefit from
social science research, but judges must take into account the need to
critically evaluate the contribution that such research can make.
II. DEFINITIONS AND A TYPOLOGY OF USES OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
A. Definitions
Post-Daubert debates have addressed the question: Is social science
really "science"?" Responding to this question requires a common
understanding of the meaning of certain fundamental terms, specifically,
"science," "scientific method," and "social science." "Science" refers to
a method of producing knowledge in which general statements-
hypotheses and theories-are tested empirically under controlled condi-
tions with the goal of producing comprehensive explanations about the
operation of some system.' 2 In the context of this understanding of sci-
ence, the "scientific method" refers to the rules or standards and commu-
nity practices by which science proceeds.1
3
Several points should be made with respect to this definition of
science. There is a decided emphasis on methodology in the definition
rather than on the system or phenomenon studied or the specific substan-
tive research findings. Daubert is consistent with this emphasis. 4 Fur-
11. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, The Evidentiary Status of Social Science Under Daubert: Is
it "Scientific," "Technical," or "Other" Knowledge?, I PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 960, 961
(1995); Daniel W. Shuman, What Should We Permit Mental Health Professionals to Say About
"the Best Interests of the Child"?: An Essay on Common Sense, Daubert, and the Rules of
Evidence, 31 FAM. L.Q. 551 (1997). For discussion of social science expert testimony based on
clinical assessments, see infra note 53 and accompanying text, and for discussion of science-based
practice claims see infra Part IV.B.
12. See, e.g., SHELDON J. LACHMAN, THE FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE 15-25 (1956); Brief of
Amici Curiae American Association for the Advancement of Science and the National Academy
of Sciences at 7-13, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (No. 92-102).
Daubert seems to embrace the definition proposed by the brief: "'Science is not an encyclopedic
body of knowledge about the universe. Instead, it represents a process for proposing and refining
theoretical explanations about the world that are subject to further testing and refinement.'
(emphasis in original)." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. See also KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W.
HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 1-22 (1997).
"Science" has also been defined as a body of knowledge. For example, the authors of
Science in the Law note that the "classical definition of a science is 'an orderly body of knowledge
with principles that are clearly enunciated."' DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW:
FORENSIC SCIENCE ISSUES § 1-5.1 (2002).
13. See, e.g., LACHMAN, supra note 12, at 51-71; DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE
LAW: STANDARDS, STATISTICS AND RESEARCH ISSUES § 4-1.2 (2002).
14. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 ("a process for proposing and refining theoretical
explanations about the world that are subject to further testing and refinement") (quoting Brief of
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
ther, the definition is cross-disciplinary in that it applies to any
discipline that employs the scientific method to produce knowledge,
regardless of the system that the discipline studies.1 5 In short, "science"
should mean the same thing to a physicist, an embryologist, a psycholo-
gist, or a demographer. What matters is the method, not the system
under study. In Part IV, we describe the logic, methodological stan-
dards, and community practices that constitute the scientific method and
discuss their relevance to social science knowledge when it is presented
to the courts.
In the context of the preceding discussion, "social science" refers to
those disciplines that employ the scientific method to study human
social systems.16 Disciplines generally included under the umbrella of
the term "social science" are anthropology, sociology, demography,
criminology, economics, political science, and most sub-fields of psy-
chology, such as developmental child psychology and social psychol-
ogy. Illustrations of social science disciplines and the respective social
systems they study would include: economics which studies production
and distribution systems of human behavior; anthropology which studies
cultural systems such as language and kinship; political science which
studies governmental systems; and sociology which studies social sys-
tems such as families, schools, and neighborhoods.
As long as the research being considered has employed the scien-
tific method, our answer to the question, "Is social science really 'sci-
ence'?" is affirmative. 7 However, we think a more useful question
Amici Curiae American Association for the Advancement of Science and the National Academy
of Sciences at 7-8, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (No. 92-102)). For
different views of what constitutes science, see e.g., LARRY LAUDAN, PROGRESS AND ITS
PROBLEMS (1977); PAUL FREYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD (3d ed. 1993). See also sources cited
infra note 162.
15. For an analysis of science and social science that similarly focuses on methodology, see
RICHARD S. RUDNER, PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 6-7 (1966).
16. For discussions of the nature of the social sciences akin to this definition, see BERNARD
BARBER, SCIENCE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 312 (First Collier Books 1962) (1952); Max Weber,
"Objectivity" in Social Science, in THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 72 (Edward A.
Shils & Henry A. Finch eds. & trans., 1949). For a sociological analysis that utilizes this
definition, see HARRY C. BREDEMEIER & RICHARD M. STEPHENSON, THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL
SYSTEMS (1962).
Within many social science disciplines there is a humanities-oriented disciplinary perspective
that does not emphasize the scientific method, but rather focuses on interpretative/hermeneutic
methods more characteristic of the humanities. One-group case studies, ethnographic studies, and
phenomenological studies would typically fall within this type of social science. See, e.g., JOHN
W. CRESWELL, RESEARCH DESIGN: QUALITATIVE & QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES (1994); J.
MASON, QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1996). Because research produced within this perspective does
not claim scientific status in the terms used in Daubert, it is beyond the scope of our analysis. For
additional discussions of this approach to social science, see ALEXANDER ROSENBERG,
PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 21 (1988).
17. For discussion of the scientific method, see infra Part W.A.
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from the point of view of a court is: When and how should courts
employ the tests of scientific validity to testimony or research based in
the social sciences? To answer this question, we need to first consider
how courts access and use social science.
B. Typology of Uses
Courts use social science in three conceptually distinct, yet interre-
lated ways, depending on the level of specificity required in a particular
case.'" This tripartite typology is useful in analyzing courts' choices of
evidentiary rules, sources of social science, and assessment tools for
reviewing social science research.
1. THE GENERAL-RULE LEVEL
First, at the most general level, appellate or trial courts may use
social science evidence to develop or clarify a rule of law. Recent court
decisions that have relaxed the restrictions on post-divorce custodial par-
ent relocation provide examples of this type of use. The California
Supreme Court, for example, appeared to rely heavily on a brief filed by
psychologist Judith Wallerstein that presented social science data favor-
ing permissive relocation when the court liberalized its relocation
requirements. ' 9 The New Jersey Supreme Court was more explicit in its
reliance on social science research through its acknowledgement that
social science research was a significant factor in its decision to liber-
alize the relocation standard. The court stated that "[m]ost importantly,
social science research links a positive outcome for children of divorce
with the welfare of the primary custodian and the stability and happiness
within that newly formed post-divorce household," and cited a number
of social science studies, many of which were taken from the Waller-
stein brief.2" In changing its relocation standard, the Tennessee
18. Professors John Monahan and Laurens Walker have proposed a three-part classification
for the courts' use of social science in relation to judicial notice: social authority, social
frameworks and social facts. See John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining,
Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (1986) [hereinafter
Social Authority]; John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social
Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987) [hereinafter Social Frameworks]; John Monahan &
Laurens Walker, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76 CAL. L. REV. 877
(1988) [hereinafter Social Facts]. Although the uses we identify have some similarities to those
identified by Professors Monahan and Walker in their analysis of judicial notice and "social
frameworks," the uses are sufficiently dissimilar that we have not used their terms to avoid
confusion.
19. In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 483 (Cal. 1996). Unfortunately, the Wallerstein
brief has been criticized extensively for a biased presentation of social science research. See infra
text accompanying notes 112-21 for additional discussion of this brief and subsequent California
relocation litigation.
20. Baures v. Lewis, 770 A.2d 214, 222 (N.J. 2001).
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Supreme Court reviewed decisions from other jurisdictions that had
adopted more liberal relocation standards and noted that the decisions
"reflect the collective wisdom of both the courts and child psychologists
that children, especially those subjected to the trauma of divorce, need
stability and continuity in relationships most of all."21
Class actions present another example of courts using social sci-
ence research to develop a broad rule. Nicholson v. Williams, for exam-
ple, involved a class action by mothers whose children had been
removed by the New York City Administration for Children's Services
(which includes child protective services) because the mothers were vic-
tims of domestic violence.22 In addition to hearing testimony about the
situations of the named plaintiffs, the trial court heard extensive expert
testimony on the effects of domestic violence on children, especially the
effect of witnessing such violence and the connection between domestic
violence and abuse directed against the children. 3 The court also heard
expert testimony regarding the effects on children when they are
removed from their homes.2 4 At the close of trial, the district court
granted a preliminary injunction to ensure that "battered mothers who
are fit to retain custody of their children do not face prosecution or
removal of their children solely because the mothers are battered, and
.. . [that] the child's right to live with such a mother is protected."2 5
2. THE INTERMEDIATE LEVEL: THE CONTEXT FOR THE CASE
Second, at an intermediate level, a court may use social science
research to present a context that is relevant to the parties' circum-
stances, but that does not include facts unique to the particular case. In
these circumstances, the court is not using social science to develop or
explicate a general rule of law, but rather solely to decide the case before
it. In In re A.W., for example, a twelve-year-old girl asked the court to
substitute counsel of her choice for her state-appointed attorney in a
child protective case.2 6 A child psychologist testified about the capacity
of twelve-year-olds to make decisions about a matter as complex as
choosing their own attorney. 27 However, as the psychologist had not
21. Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Taylor v. Taylor, 849 S.W.2d 319,
328 (Tenn. 1993)).
22. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (certifying a number of
state law questions to the New York Court of Appeals while on appeal to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the case of Nicholson v. Scopetta, 344 F.3d 154 (2d Cir.
2003)).
23. Id. at 197-98.
24. Id. at 198-99.
25. Id. at 257.
26. In re A.W., 618 N.E.2d 729 (I11. App. Ct. 1993).
27. Id. at 732.
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evaluated the girl prior to his testimony, he was only able to provide a
general opinion rather than one based upon the capacity of the child in
this case.
Syndrome evidence falls into this intermediate category when an
expert testifies about a syndrome in general without having clinically
evaluated anyone directly involved in the case before the court.
28
Indeed, even when an expert has evaluated someone involved in the
case, a jurisdiction's evidentiary rules may require that the expert testify
only in general terms without relating the general syndrome characteris-
tics to a party in the case; this situation especially arises in criminal
cases.29 In Commonwealth v. Trowbridge, for example, the appellate
court held that the testimony of a pediatric gynecologist, who was an
expert witness on sexually abused children, should have been excluded.
The expert "not only testified that the child's behavior was consistent
with that of sexually abused children, she also testified that the symp-
toms and physical condition of the child were consistent with the type of
non-violent sexual abuse that the child alleged in this case."30 Accord-
ing to the court, expert testimony on general behavioral characteristics
of sexually abused children was permissible, but an expert could not
compare the child to those general characteristics because "such testi-
mony impermissibly intrudes on the jury's province to assess the credi-
bility of the witness."'"
Another example of this type of context testimony is the use of an
expert's opinion on the suggestibility of child witnesses. In U.S. v.
Rouse, the court found that the exclusion of a psychologist's expert testi-
mony on the credibility of the child witnesses was proper.32 The trial
court had allowed the expert's testimony about his own research on sug-
gestibility and learned or "implanted" memory as it related to improper
interviewing techniques used by investigators that taint the testimony of
child witnesses. The court noted the "troublesome line" between the
application of the expert's general opinions to the case at hand, and the
expert's impermissible opinion on the child witnesses' credibility.33
28. Pratt v. Wood, 620 N.Y.S.2d 551 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (finding expert testimony on
battered wife syndrome admissible evidence); People v. Taylor, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883 (N.Y. 1990)
(holding that under certain circumstances and subject to certain limitations, evidence of rape
trauma syndrome is both relevant and admissible evidence).
29. Commonwealth v. Trowbridge, 647 N.E.2d 413 (Mass. 1995); cf In re Nicole V., 518
N.E.2d 914 (N.Y. 1987) (allowing an expert to testify in child protective case that the child
exhibited characteristics of the sexually abused child syndrome for the purpose of corroborating
the child's out-of-court statements).
30. Trowbridge, 647 N.E.2d at 420.
31. Id. (citation omitted).
32. United States v. Rouse, Ill F.3d 561 (8th Cir. 1997).
33. Id. at 571.
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3. THE CASE-SPECIFIC LEVEL
At the most specific level, courts may use an expert's research-
based testimony that relates to facts unique to the case before the court.
Testimony on a custody evaluation is an example of research-based, spe-
cific testimony about individuals involved in the case. The evaluator,
for example, would have assessed the family in accordance with a proto-
col that is based in social science research, often using standardized tests
as part of the assessment.34 The expert's testimony, however, might
consist almost entirely of a report on the clinical assessment with little
evidence being presented on the research supporting the expert's
approach.
Syndrome evidence is another example of case-specific testimony,
when a court allows testimony about whether a party to a case is exhibit-
ing characteristics of a syndrome and what that implies for the disposi-
tion of the case. The testimony on the syndrome itself would be based
in research and the characteristics of the individual would be based on a
clinical assessment. For instance, in Soutiere v. Soutiere, an expert was
allowed to testify that the plaintiff wife in a divorce action suffered from
"a version of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), commonly known
in this context as battered-woman syndrome."35 The trial court had
found "the expert's opinions helpful 'to understand the evidence' bear-
ing on property distribution and maintenance. 36
This type of syndrome testimony has been allowed in criminal
cases as well. In State v. Nemeth, for example, the court allowed testi-
mony on the battered child syndrome generally and also allowed testi-
mony that Brian, the sixteen-year-old defendant who had killed his
parent, was an abused child.37  The expert psychologist who had
examined Brian was also an expert on the battered child syndrome. The
court held that the evidence was relevant to elements of Brian's defense,
including the determination of whether he "had an honest belief that he
was in imminent danger, a necessary element in the affirmative defense
of self-defense." 38 Further, the court stated:
General information on battered child syndrome would also tend to
show that Brian's behavior was consistent with that of an abused
child and would lend support to his testimony that he had been
34. See, e.g., Azia v. DiLascia, 780 A.2d 992, 996 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) (using psychologist-
conducted clinical interviews, observation, and a battery of tests to evaluate both the parents and
the child). See generally JONATHAN W. GOULD, CONDUCTING SCIENTIFICALLY CRAFrED CHILD
CUSTODY EVALUATIONS (1998).
35. Soutiere v. Soutiere, 657 A.2d 206, 208 (Vt. 1995).
36. Id. at 209.
37. State v. Nemeth, 694 N.E.2d 1332 (Ohio 1998).
38. Id. at 1336.
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abused both generally and just prior to the killing. We have held that
an expert may not offer an opinion as to the truth of a child's state-
ment. However, an expert may provide testimony that supports "the
truth of the facts testified to by the child, or which assists the fact
finder in assessing the child's veracity." Expert testimony on bat-
tered child syndrome would, in this case, tend to enhance the
probability that Brian's account of the facts leading up to the killing
was truthful and would lend credibility to his assertion that he was in
a state of rage and dissociation at the time of the killing. A diagnosis
of battered child syndrome and an explanation of its effects would
therefore be relevant in determining whether the case warranted a
jury charge on voluntary manslaughter.39
At this case-specific level, particularly where the testimony is
focused entirely on the individuals in the case, as in a custody evalua-
tion, questions might be raised about whether the testimony should be
evaluated as "science."4 Perhaps, following Federal Rules of Evidence,
it should be classified as "technical or other specialized knowledge,"
rather than as "scientific" knowledge.41 Here, the salient issue is
whether the presenters of the evidence are claiming, explicitly or implic-
itly, that their knowledge has scientific validity. Are they presenting
themselves as experts with a gloss of scientific knowledge? Are they
employing evaluative practices that purportedly are based in science?42
If they are, then their testimony should be scrutinized for scientific
validity. Generally, when persons trained in social science are present-
ing evidence, they are making this claim, at least implicitly, and there-
fore questions of scientific validity should be addressed. Even though
their testimony may be directed at their evaluation of an individual, its
context is based in a scientific discipline. We propose that social sci-
39. Id. (citations omitted). Cases involving battered women are another example of testimony
including both the individual's diagnosis and general information about the syndrome. See, e.g.,
State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 975 (Ohio 1990) ("Where the evidence establishes that a woman is
a battered woman, and when an expert is qualified to testify about the battered woman syndrome,
expert testimony concerning the syndrome may be admitted to assist the trier of fact in
determining whether the defendant acted in self-defense.").
40. See, e.g., Daniel A. Krauss & Bruce D. Sales, The Problem of "Helpfulness" in Applying
Daubert to Expert Testimony: Child Custody Determinations in Family Law as an Exemplar, 5
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 78, 87 (1999) (suggesting that an expert's opinion based on a clinical
assessment has "no science").
41. FED. R. EvID. 702. It is important to note that even if the testimony is classified as
"technical or other specialized knowledge," rather than as "scientific" knowledge, a high level of
scrutiny should be employed. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999) ("[A]
trial court should consider the specific factors identified in Daubert where they are reasonable
measures of the reliability of expert testimony.").
42. In Part IV, we describe such testimony as an illustration of a science-based practice
claim.
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ence-based testimony at all these levels and from all sources, should be
assessed using the tools presented in Part IV of this article.
III. SOURCES OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
Courts access social science through three mechanisms: expert tes-
timony, briefs, and judicial notice. Whatever the source of social sci-
ence or the level of its use, we recommend that courts employ an
expansive gate-keeping function and examine the scientific validity of
the social science as well as its relevance to the issues in the case. This
expansion of Daubert is needed if courts are to use social science suc-
cessfully, particularly because the evidentiary distinctions among
sources are not often clear. The following sections consider the sources
of social science in relation to the level of its use as outlined in the prior
section. Table 1 provides an overview of these relationships.
TABLE 1: SOURCES OF SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SPECIFICITY OF SOCIAL
SCIENCE USES IN FAMILY AND CHILD
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING
1. Expert Testimony
a. General Rule Level
b. Intermediate Level
c. Case-Specific Level
2. Briefs
a. General Rule Level
b. Intermediate Level
c. Case-Specific Level
3. Judicial Notice
a. General Rule Level
b. Intermediate Level
c. Case-Specific Level
A. Expert Testimony
Experts rely on social science research to provide information
related to family law cases in all three levels of specificity described in
Part II. In order for the expert to be permitted to testify, the trial court
must decide that the testimony is relevant and will assist the trier of fact,
that the expert is qualified, and that the testimony is reliable or grounded
in validated scientific procedures.43 This section considers these factors
43. FED. R. EvID. 702, Testimony by Experts.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
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and also addresses two additional issues, namely whether an expert
should testify on the ultimate issue and what standard of review should
be applied to an admissibility determination.
1. RELEVANCE AND ASSISTANCE
According to the Daubert interpretation of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the Rule 702 requirement that the evidence or testimony
"assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue" is related "primarily to relevance."'  An additional aspect of
Rule 702 and of relevancy is the notion of "fit."4 According to the
Court, "'[f]it' is not always obvious, and scientific validity for one pur-
pose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated pur-
poses.. . Rule 702's 'helpfulness' standard requires a valid scientific
connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility."46
In other words, a qualified expert who has done high quality research is
not allowed to testify on that basis alone; there must be a connection
between what the expert knows and what the court needs to determine.
2. QUALIFYING AN EXPERT
The trial court determines whether an individual qualifies as an
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the
case.
The Rule was amended in 2000 in response to Daubert and codifies its general principles. FED. R.
EVID. 702 advisory committee's note. As noted previously, state evidence rules track the federal
rules, see supra note 6.
Note that the evidentiary term "reliable" has a different meaning than the social science term
"reliability." See infra text accompanying note 171.
44. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993) ("Expert testimony which
does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful." (quoting 3 JACK B.
WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702.02 (Joseph M.
McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1993))).
45. Id. at 591 ("An additional consideration under Rule 702-and another aspect of
relevancy-is whether expert testimony proffered in the case is sufficiently tied to the facts of the
case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute." (quoting United States v. Downing,
753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985))).
46. Id. at 591-92. It has been noted, however, that "[a]rguably ... the notions of 'fit' and
'helpfulness' already exist in Rule 402's relevancy requirement," but that Rule 702 goes beyond
Rule 402 to also require that the expert be qualified and that the content of the expert's testimony
be scientifically valid. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 19. Rule 401 defines relevant evidence
as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
FED. R. EVID. 401.
47. For further discussion of the problem of "fit," see infra Part IV.B.3.b.
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expert by considering factors such as the individual's "knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education."48 Because these factors are interre-
lated and should be assessed in relation to the proffered testimony, there
is not an absolute delineation between qualified and unqualified testi-
mony. A social science expert testifying about a law reform issue, for
example, would need training in research methodology, experience in
conducting research in the relevant substantive area, and knowledge of
the field, but would not need clinical experience. This type of law
reform expertise was used in Baehr v. Miike, which involved a challenge
by gay couples to Hawaii's ban on gay marriages.4 9 Both sides used
experts such as psychologists and sociologists to testify on aspects of
marriage and parenting.5 0 For this testimony, the experts did not need
clinical experience, because they did not need to evaluate the couples
who were challenging Hawaii law. Instead, they testified about these
issues in relation to the general population. Sociologist David
Eggebeen, for example, testified on "changes or trends which have
occurred in parenting, child bearing, and labor force behavior."'" Psy-
chologist Charlotte Patterson's testimony included descriptions of two
studies she had conducted on the children of lesbian and gay parents.52
In contrast to these experts who were testifying about research find-
ings, mental health professionals testifying about their evaluation of a
parent in relation to a custody matter would need clinical training and
experience in custody evaluations, as well as the ability to explain how
their observations, assessments, instruments, inferences, and conclusions
fit within a conceptual model that is based in scientific research and
theory.53
Some proposals for evaluating experts' qualifications seem not to
be based on a discipline's criteria, but rather on subjective models of
proper techniques and content that apparently the judge should incorpo-
rate through judicial notice. 54 Some seem difficult to apply in the con-
text of a trial, but more importantly, models of evaluative techniques and
content should be explicit so that the assumptions about what is "proper"
48. FED. R. EVID. 702.
49. Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, *1 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996),
rev'd and remanded, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999). Interestingly, in this pre-Daubert case the expert
testimony of one of the state's experts, a psychologist, was allowed but his testimony was found to
be "not persuasive or believable because of his expressed bias against the social sciences...," as
well as problematic due to his "severe views" such as his belief "that there is no scientific proof
that evolution occurred." Id. at *8-9.
50. Id. at *8-9.
51. Id. at *6.
52. id. at *12-13.
53. See GOULD, supra note 34, at 49-50, 75-76.
54. For discussion of judicial notice, see infra Part III.C.
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can be examined. In the assessment of the expert's skills, for example,
one approach recommended by a national interdisciplinary team is to
examine child custody evaluation experts' skills of "commission and
omission. '55 The judge is to determine if the expert is able:
[t]o interview children sensitively so as to understand and appreciate
their individuality, their wants and their needs, without mistaking
their own responses to those needs for the ones every parent should
have, to be able to identify and understand childhood emotional dis-
orders without assuming that any such disorder is disabling and/or
inconsistent with maintenance of a satisfactory parent-child
relationship.56
The proposal did not indicate how a judge could undertake this
skills assessment at a preliminary stage in a meaningful way, how coun-
sel or the expert would know what criteria the judge was using, or why
these were the most relevant skills-assessment criteria.
Determining the expert's training and knowledge of research in his
or her field and assessing the expert's adherence to the field's profes-
sional guidelines would be a better, more scientifically-based approach,
which could also be more fairly anticipated by counsel and the expert.
For example, the experts in Baehr should have been knowledgeable
about the requirements for literature reviews when they were summariz-
ing the research in a particular area.57 A psychologist who performs
custody evaluations should be familiar with the American Psychological
Association's (APA) Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations in
Divorce Proceedings, which include provisions related to personal and
55. NAT'L INTERDISCIPLINARY COLLOQUIUM ON CHILD CUSTODY, LEGAL & MENTAL HEALTH
PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD CUSTODY LAW: A DESKBOOK FOR JUDGES § 27:2 (1998).
56. Id. Additional suggestions include that:
a. The evaluator should know how to interview adults fairly, to diagnose any
psychopathology in order to determine whether it has an adverse impact on parent-
child relationships, to distinguish between clinical conditions and those inevitable
and ordinary fears, traumas, and shortcomings of all adults that affect but do not
undermine relationships with children and their ordinary growth and development to
adulthood, to understand whether a parent can appreciate a child's special needs so
as to provide for them.
b. To evaluate parenting skills and to identify deficiencies in those skills without
mistaking an unusual parenting style, or differences between the evaluator's (or
"normal" people's) parenting styles and the subject's with a deficiency in parenting
skill.
Id.
57. See infra Part IV.C.3.
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societal biases,58 methods of data gathering, 59 and interpretation of
data.6' Also of relevance are the Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psy-
chologists which state:
Forensic psychologists have an obligation to present to the court,
regarding the specific matters to which they will testify, the bounda-
ries of their competence, the factual bases (knowledge, skill, experi-
ence, training, and education) for their qualifications as an expert,
and the relevance of those factual bases to their qualification as an
expert on the specific matters at issue.61
This suggests that one aspect of the court's evaluation of an expert's
qualifications should be how forthcoming and clear the expert is with
58. American Psychological Association, Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations in
Divorce Proceedings, 29 FAM. L.Q. 51, 55-56 (1995), available at 49 AMER. PSYCHOLOGIST 677
(1994) and http://www.apa.org/practice/childcustody.html:
The psychologist engaging in child custody evaluations is aware of how biases
regarding age, gender, race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sexual orientation,
disability, language, culture and socioeconomic status may interfere with an
objective evaluation and recommendations. The psychologist recognizes and strives
to overcome any such biases, or withdraws from the evaluation.
Id.
59. Id. at 57:
The psychologist strives to use the most appropriate methods available for
addressing the questions raised in a specific child custody evaluation, and generally
uses multiple methods of data gathering, including, but not limited to, clinical
interviews, observation and/or psychological assessments. Important facts and
opinions are documented from at least two sources whenever their reliability is
questionable. The psychologist, for example, may review potentially relevant
reports, e.g., from schools, health care providers, child care providers, agencies, and
institutions. Psychologists may also interview extended family, friends, and other
individuals on occasions when the information is likely to be useful. If information
is gathered from third parties that is significant and may be used as a basis for
conclusions, psychologists corroborate it by at least one other source wherever
possible and appropriate, and document this in the report.
Id.
60. Id.
The psychologist refrains from drawing conclusions not adequately supported by the
data. The psychologist interprets any data from interviews or tests, as well as any
questions of data reliability and validity, cautiously and conservatively, seeking
convergent validity. The psychologist strives to acknowledge to the court any
limitations in methods or data used.
Id.
61. The Guidelines are endorsed by the American Academy of Forensic Psychology and are
not an official statement of the American Psychological Association. The Guidelines are reprinted
in GOULD, supra note 34, at 336-45 and in 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 655 (1991). Guidelines have
also been promulgated by the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts (www.afccnet.org).
Additionally, there are a number of texts on custody evaluation protocol. See, e.g., GOULD, supra
note 34; PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS & LAWYERS (Gary B. Melton et al., eds., 2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS].
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regard to his or her own abilities in relation to the questions to be
addressed.
3. RELIABILITY
In addition to determining whether an expert is qualified, the court
must decide whether the testimony the expert will present is reliable.
The issue of what standards courts should use to decide whether scien-
tific expert testimony is admissible has been a subject of lively debate.
Trial courts' evaluations differ along two dimensions.62 First, judges
differ on how active a role they ought to take in screening the evidence
that will be heard, as some judges are more willing than others to let
expert evidence be presented. Second, courts differ on how to assess the
evidence being offered. The two most prevalent models for assessing
the proffered testimony in the United States are the "general acceptance
test" developed in Frye v. U.S.63 and the gate-keeper model posited in
Daubert.64
The succinctly stated Frye test does not provide much guidance to
judges on how to determine whether something is generally acceptable:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle
must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle
or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the par-
ticular field in which it belongs.65
Under Daubert general acceptance is not sufficient. Instead judges, as
gate-keepers, must make their own assessment of the scientific merit of
the testimony:
[T]he trial judge must determine at the outset.., whether the expert
is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist
the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. This
entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or method-
ology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether
that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in
* 66issue.
Although Daubert provided more guidance than Frye, it left a num-
ber of unanswered questions as well. Daubert did not clarify, for exam-
62. See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 13, § 1.10.
63. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
64. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
65. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
66. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
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pie, whether a court could declare expert evidence inadmissible where
the expert's methodology, data and application satisfied Daubert
requirements, but the expert nonetheless reached a conclusion that was
not in accord with the scientific community.67 Daubert's definition of
"science" has been criticized, as has the lack of clarity about whether a
Daubert analysis should apply to expert testimony that falls outside the
narrow definition of "science." 68 Some of these questions have been
answered in subsequent cases, but uncertainties remain.69
The focus of this paper, however, is not on precise standards for
admissibility, but rather on using a gate-keeping model in family law
cases generally to evaluate social science. Part IV of this paper provides
evaluative tools for judges to use for this purpose. It is important to note
briefly here, however, that there are some conceptual problems with the
use of a gate-keeper model, which often appear when experts are used in
family law cases. First, much of the research that the expert is relying
on can present many challenges for the gate-keeping judge as it may be
relatively new, may have methodological problems, or may not directly
67. See, e.g., John M. Conley & David W. Peterson, The Science of Gatekeeping: The
Federal Judicial Center's New Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1183,
1201 (1996). According to the Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence, "[tihe
Court in Daubert declared that the 'focus, of course, must be solely on principles and
methodology, not on the conclusions they generate.' Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. Yet as the Court
later recognized, 'conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another.'
General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)." FED. R. Evto. 702 advisory committee's
note. In Joiner, the Court went on to note that, "[a] court may conclude that there is simply too
great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered." Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.
Michael Saks argues that Joiner should be interpreted to be consistent with Daubert's
methodology and conclusions:
These grounds for excluding the testimony preserve Daubert's sensible distinction
between methodology and conclusions. A person evaluating a study is capable of
assessing the methodology of the study (its design, procedures, and measures)
without looking at the study's results. This review of methodology permits a
judgment about the weight that should be given [to] the data produced by the study.
The person then can evaluate the inferences that the study's author or an expert
witness draws from the data. Conclusions cannot stand unless they are rationally
supported by the data. And the data cannot stand unless they are generated by
sound methodology. One may reject the data and any conclusions based on those
data because one finds the methodology unsound. One ought not reject data
because one does not agree with the conclusions implied by the data. To the extent
that it muddies those distinctions, Joiner leads us astray.
Saks, supra note 6, at 236.
68. See, e.g., Conley & Peterson, supra note 67, at 1201-02. This issue was addressed in
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). See FED. R. Evro. 702 advisory
committee's note ("In Daubert the Court charged trial judges with the responsibility of acting as
gatekeepers to exclude unreliable expert testimony, and the Court in Kumho clarified that this
gatekeeper function applies to all expert testimony, not just testimony based in science.").
69. Saks, supra note 6.
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relate to the question the expert is asked to address.7" Second, the
expert's testimony is often primarily about the expert's clinical assess-
ment of an individual, rather than about the underlying research that
supports the clinical methodology and conclusions.7 Third, usually the
judge, not a jury, is the fact-finder.
The use of the judge as fact-finder is a major distinction between
many family law cases and jury-decided cases addressed in post-
Daubert analyses. In family cases, judges are screening the expert to
determine if they themselves should hear the expert's testimony. Many
post-Daubert analyses address how a judge should proceed in jury trials,
recommending for example, that the court hold a separate hearing away
from the jury to decide on the admissibility of expert testimony.7"
Because family cases typically proceed without a jury, the judge in a
family matter might be more likely to permit expert testimony, once the
expert is qualified, rather than separately assessing whether the expert's
testimony should be admissible. The judge would not spend time hold-
ing a separate hearing on admissibility (a Daubert hearing), but rather at
trial the judge could simply give little or no weight to the expert's testi-
mony if it became clear that an evaluation was performed improperly or
there were other problems with the testimony. 73
In addition to saving time, judges might have other motives for this
practice. Judges have noted, for example, that allowing experts to testify
has the advantage of granting to litigants who have paid for the experts a
sense that they have been fully heard, which is an important component
of fairness.74 In addition, many appellate courts do not consider the
receipt of inadmissible evidence over an objection to be a basis for
reversal if there is admissible evidence to support the court's findings.
In such a situation, the appellate court presumes that the judge only con-
sidered the admissible evidence.76 However, if the trial judge refuses to
70. See infra Part IV; see also Margaret F. Brinig, Promoting Children's Interests Through a
Responsible Research Agenda, 14 U. FLA. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 137 (2003).
71. See infra Part III.A.
72. The separate hearing "entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or
methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). Indeed, a major justification for having the screening is skepticism
about the capacity of the jury. See, e.g., I MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 60 (John W. Strong ed.,
5th ed. 1999).
73. Judges' abilities to disregard nonscientifically supported expert testimony has been
questioned. See, e.g., Shuman, supra note 11, at 568-69. See generally PETER HUBER, GALILEO'S
REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991).
74. See TOM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY (1998).
75. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 72, § 60.
76. Id.
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admit evidence that should have been admitted, reversal is more likely.77
This more liberal admissibility approach has the disadvantage that evi-
dentiary rulings may not be as explicit as those resulting from Daubert
hearings, where the content of the expert's testimony may be hotly
contested.
Azia v. DiLascia is an example of a court allowing an expert to
testify, but then giving the testimony little weight.78 Interestingly
enough, the trial court justified its treatment of the expert's testimony by
taking judicial notice of professional standards. The expert's lack of
adherence to the APA's Guidelines for Child Custody in Divorce Pro-
ceedings and the Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists was an
important factor in the trial court's consideration of the weight to be
given to the expert's testimony.7 9 The expert in Azia had served in a
capacity that was similar to a court-appointed custody evaluator, but
subsequently became the child's therapist. The trial court determined
that it would accord "her expert opinion little weight," noting the ethical
restraints placed on dual roles and the expert's failure to consider
these.8" On appeal, the plaintiff challenged the trial court's judicial
notice of the APA ethical rules.8" The appellate court held that "[t]he
ethical rules applicable to the profession of a witness are permissible for
judicial notice because a professional, who is a member of an associa-
tion, is held accountable to know those ethical rules."82 Further, the
appellate court held that the defendant in fact had notice that the expert's
ethics were at issue because of the questions the judge had asked at
trial .83
In contrast, consider the more formal Daubert-hearing used in Dah-
77. Id.
78. Azia v. DiLascia, 780 A.2d 992 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
79. Azia v. DiLascia, No. FA 980548239S, 1999 WL 989461, at *9 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct.
18, 1999).
80. Id. at *9:
81. Azia, 780 A.2d at 995.
82. Id. at 1005.
83. Id. The questions included the following colloquy:
The Court: And you are a member of like the American Psychological Association
or something like that?
[Hanley-Kallen]: Yes, Your Honor.
The Court: And do you live by their rules on ethics and stuff like that?
[Hanley-Kallen]: Yes.
The Court: Any organization other than the APA?
[Hanley-Kallen]: Diplomat status in child psychology and child custody evaluation.
The Court: Does that subject you to any other association rules on ethics?
[Hanley-Kallen]: Yes.
The Court: Who's that?
[Hanley-Kallen]: The American Forensic Association. I just became diplomat. I
am not sure of the initials.
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lin v. Evangelical Child and Family Agency, a tort action by adoptive
parents for medical expenses and emotional damages against an adop-
tion agency for nondisclosure of information about their adopted child.84
Prior to trial the court heard a number of in limine motions related to
admissibility of expert testimony. The plaintiff parents, for example,
moved to bar the testimony of an agency expert who was to testify on
the history of adoption practice and on his opinion that the child suffered
from "reactive attachment disorder," which the agency characterized as
"a condition prevalent among adopted children which makes then [sic]
unable to form attachments with other people, including the adoptive
parents who care for them."85 The agency apparently was contending
that the child's problems following adoption were attributable to "fac-
tors common among adoptive children," rather than to the child's own
"psychological dysfunction."86 The court held that the expert's written
report, "which was required to 'contain a complete statement of all opin-
ions to be expressed ... and the basis and reasons therefor [and] the
data or other information considered by [the expert] in forming the
opinions,'" failed to provide a sufficient foundation for the expert ren-
dering a diagnosis of the child.87 The court examined what the expert
had actually done and his professional training and noted that among
other failings, the expert had not examined the child and he was not a
psychiatrist or clinical psychologist. The court concluded that the
expert's opinion was inadmissible because neither the expert nor the
agency had "provided the Court with anything that even suggests, let
alone shows, that [the expert's] opinion regarding [the child's] condition
is 'the product of reliable principles and methods' that 'the witnesses
[sic] has applied ... reliably to the facts of the case.' "88 The expert was
allowed to testify about "attachment problems generally and how they
manifest themselves."89 Unlike the fact-finder judge in Azia, the fact-
finder jury in Dahlin would hear only that expert testimony that had
passed Daubert screening.
The Court: Did you consult with the ethical rules before making the decision to
become [the child's] therapist?
[Hanley-Kallen]: No, I did not.
Id. at 1005 n.15.
84. Dahlin v. Evangelical Child & Family Agency, No. 01 C 1182, 2002 WL 31834881, *1
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2002).
85. Id. at *7.
86. Id.
87. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)).
88. Id. (quoting FED. R. EvID. 702).
89. Id. at *8.
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4. TESTIMONY ON THE ULTIMATE QUESTION
Another dispute surrounds the question of whether the expert
should be allowed to testify to the ultimate question being considered by
the court - a question that has particularly arisen in custody cases.90 For
example, should the expert testify as to what custody placement is in the
child's "best interests" if that is the legal standard for the decision, or
should the expert testify only as to such matters as the parent-child rela-
tionship, the results of psychological testing, and similar areas which
could be grounded in professional, peer-reviewed literature?
Courts and lawyers may want the expert's opinion on the ultimate
issue and may characterize it as a valuable piece of information to aid a
judge in forming an opinion. Some scholars, however, argue strongly
that "mental health professionals ordinarily should refrain from giving
opinions as to ultimate legal issues" and suggest that "there is near-una-
nimity among scholarly commentators" on this point.9 ' They also note,
however, that most jurisdictions allow and some may require the expert
to recommend which placement is best for the child.92 The major pro-
fessional organizations have not taken a position on this issue.93 For
example, the APA Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations in Divorce
Proceedings state:
While the profession has not reached consensus about whether psy-
chologists ought to make recommendations about the final custody
determination to the courts, psychologists are obligated to be aware
of the arguments on both sides of this issue, and to be able to explain
the logic of their position concerning their own practice. 94
Those opposed to the expert offering an opinion on "best interests"
may note that expert testimony on the "ultimate issue," which was once
prohibited at common law, is still characterized as unhelpful and can be
excluded on that basis.95 Using a Daubert analysis should likewise
result in the exclusion of the expert's testimony on "best interests." A
90. MARC J. ACKERMAN & ANDREW W. KANE, PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERTS IN DIVORCE
ACTIONS § 1.1 (3d ed. 1998).
91. PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS, supra note 61, §1.04, at 17 (emphasis in original).
92. ACKERMAN & KANE, supra note 90, § 1.1. A survey of Michigan judges and attorneys
found that 84% of the judges thought that custody evaluations should provide recommendations
about custody. James N. Bow & Francella A. Quinnell, Critique of Child Custody Evaluations by
the Legal Profession, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 115 (2004).
93. ACKERMAN & KANE, supra note 90, § 1.1.
94. American Psychological Association, supra note 58, at 58. The forensic guidelines do not
directly address this issue.
95. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 361
(2d ed. 1994) (noting also that FED. R. EVID. 704 abrogated the common law prohibition on
"ultimate issue" testimony). Generally, also, an expert is not allowed to express "legal
conclusions." The best interest standard, however, is a blend of fact and law, which makes this
objection less salient. Id.
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decision on the ultimate issue requires legal analysis and consideration
of many factors, some of which may not be known to the expert.
Because the best interest standard is admittedly indeterminate, it is not
possible to critically assess the expert's predictions on which outcome
would serve the child's best interests. In other words, the expert's opin-
ion would not have scientific validity and should not be allowed under
Daubert.
5. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Generally, barring an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
judge, an appellate court does not overturn the trial court's determina-
tion that a witness is qualified as an expert.9 6 The standard of review for
the decision on admissibility is also abuse of discretion, although several
scholars have argued that under a gate-keeper model this should be a de
novo review, similar to an appellate court's review of a matter of law.9 7
Under this de novo approach, the appellate court decision would then be
binding on lower courts. Michael Saks, for example, argues that general
admissibility decisions about scientific theories and their general appli-
cations should be the same across cases and that only the specific appli-
cations should vary by case.98 If admissibility questions are similar
across cases, rulings on admissibility should be treated as matters of law
to ensure consistency from case-to-case. In his view, this approach
would be both more efficient and more coherent.99
B. Briefs
In addition to accessing social science through experts, courts also
receive social science information in briefs. Indeed, the Supreme
Court's use of social science often is dated from its 1908 decision in
Muller v. Oregon. °° In Muller, Louis Brandeis, representing the state,
filed a brief that provided extensive research documentation related to
96. See, e.g., FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 13, § 1-3.3.2; Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.
136 (1997) (holding that abuse of discretion is the proper standard by which to review a lower
court's decision to admit or exclude scientific evidence).
97. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Hugo, 700 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1998) (challenging both the
qualifications and the reliability of the expert's methodology, but no abuse of discretion by the
trial judge was found with regard to admission of the expert's testimony). The Hugo court noted
that the expert who testified on the child's placement "had reviewed the case file, interviewed the
parties, and gathered information from service providers, a methodology strikingly similar to that
used by [the other parties'] own experts" and that "there was adequate support in the record for the
judge's conclusion that [the expert's] testimony was based on a reliable methodology." Id. at 526.
See also, e.g., FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 13, § 1-3.6; Social Authority, supra note 18.
98. Saks, supra note 6, at 231-35.
99. Id.
100. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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the challenged labor law, which provided special protections for
women.' '1 The Court took judicial notice of the material in the brief,
which demonstrated that women's physical structure and family respon-
sibilities justified protective legislation. Judicial notice of this "general
knowledge" and "widespread belief' allowed the Court to conclude that
there was a rational basis for the Oregon legislation.02
1. LEVEL OF SPECIFICITY AND CHOICE OF TRIAL OR APPELLATE LEVEL
Courts can receive social science information in briefs at all three
levels of specificity: the general-rule level, the intermediate level, and
the case-specific level.'03 Different rules apply, however, depending on
whether the brief is introduced at the trial or the appellate stage. The
Brandeis brief contained materials that had not been presented at trial;
even today there is no procedural bar to including new social science
materials in an appellate brief or argument, so long as the material
presented is at the general level of law formation."0 4 Whether attorneys
obtain the best result for their clients by waiting until the appellate stage
to present social science or other non-legal materials is an issue debated
by advocates. One scholar argues that such information is best intro-
duced at the appellate level in a brief, where the lawyer may use social
science research to justify a particular policy choice. 0 5 She thinks that
appellate courts are more likely than trial courts to incorporate these
materials into their decision making.0 6 An opposing view is that
presenting social science evidence at the trial level is more advantageous
than waiting until the appellate level, because attorneys who present
material at trial have more control over the fact-finding process and
lessen the likelihood that judges will seek additional information without
the assistance of the parties.'0 7
When the brief is at the intermediate or case-specific level, rather
than the general-rule level, the use of social science information that was
not introduced into evidence becomes more problematic. An appellate
brief that examines the facts of the particular case in relation to social
101. Id. at 419.
102. The decision was in the Lochner era, when the Court closely scrutinized and invalidated
labor legislation as "an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with the right and
liberty of the individual to contract in relation to his labor, and as such was . . . void under, the
Federal Constitution." Id. at 418. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
103. See infra Part III, Table 1.
104. See Ellie Margolis, Beyond Brandeis: Exploring the Uses of Non-Legal Materials in
Appellate Briefs, 34 U.S.F. L. REv. 197, 202, 205 (2000).
105. Id. at 210-19.
106. Id. at 218.
107. John Frazier Jackson, The Brandeis Brief-Too Little, Too Late: The Trial Court as a
Superior Forum for Presenting Legislative Facts, AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 1, 2-3 (1993).
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science could only include facts that were in the trial record. Further, it
may be argued that the relationship of the social science to the case facts
should also be viewed as a factual issue, which, therefore, could not be
presented for the first time at the appellate level.,0 8
2. BIAS
From the point of view of the judicial system, it is not clear whether
experts' testimony or briefs result in a more accurate presentation of
social science information. Expert testimony has been criticized for
being biased and incomplete. 10 9 The effectiveness of cross-examination
and other adversary system tools designed to eliminate bias have been
criticized as well.' 0 Briefs, however, have also been criticized for bias
and incomplete reviews of social science research. Amici briefs filed by
special interests groups too often contain "junk social science" which is
"characterized by quotes from social scientific research taken out of con-
text, misleading statistical presentations, denigration of studies whose
results conflicted with the argument, and anecdotes masquerading as
social science findings.""'
Unfortunately, even briefs that have been written by seemingly
neutral social scientists have been criticized for biased presentations. A
recent example is the amicus brief filed by Judith Wallerstein in the
California relocation case of In re Marriage of Burgess." 2 Dr. Waller-
stein's brief has been criticized for reviewing only ten social science
articles, seven of which were from her own research group, rather than
doing a comprehensive review;" 3 for misinterpreting the findings of
108. See infra Part III.C.
109. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 9, at 1556.
110. Id.
111. Michal Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective
Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REv. 91, 128 (1993) (examining amici briefs filed on tort
punitive damage issues). See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Rutherford Institute at ix., 1, 13, Cox
v. State Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1995) (No. 82-967)
(supporting a ban on homosexual adoption by stating that scientific research "conclusively
establishes that homosexual households present an unhealthy, insecure environment for children,"
but also stating that "studies on the effects of homosexual parenting of children are scant, highly
publicized, and conducted largely by lesbian researchers in very limited samples," and that
scientific researchers who have reservations about placing a child in a homosexual household
"would be unable to develop a rapport with homosexual parents and thus gain the data necessary
for a study").
112. In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996). Following the case decision, an
article was written adapted from the brief. Judith S. Wallerstein & Tony J. Tanke, To Move or
Not to Move: Psychological and Legal Considerations in the Relocation of Children Following
Divorce, 30 FAM. L.Q. 305 (1998).
113. Richard A. Warshak, Social Science and Children's Best Interests in Relocation Cases:
Burgess Revisited, 34 FAM. L.Q. 83 (2000).
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some studies;114 for failing to note the limitations of the social science
research she reviewed;1 15 and for "ignoring the broad consensus of pro-
fessional opinion" that would not support her conclusion in favor of the
custodial parent's control over relocation.116 In spite of these flaws, Dr.
Wallerstein's brief was relied on in Burgess and has been very influen-
tial in other relocation cases, such as the New Jersey case, Baures v.
Lewis, and possibly also the New York case, Tropea v. Tropea.1 17
In a relocation case subsequent to Burgess, the California Supreme
Court was provided with two competing amici briefs from social scien-
tists and mental health experts.1 1 8 Both unfortunately took advocacy
positions, rather than emphasizing the limited contribution current social
science research can make to the relocation debate. The brief authored
by psychologist Richard Warshak, for example, takes the position,
which is unsupported by any of the social science research it reviews,
that custodial parents' relocation requests "would not be proposed unless
the moving parent placed a higher value on the anticipated gains of the
move than on the nonmoving parent's regular involvement in the fabric
of the children's lives." '119 It recommends that California relocation law
adopt a case-by-case comprehensive examination of the potential detri-
ment of relocation, but does not recommend or even address whether the
court should consider the potential detriment of non-relocation or of a
custodial change. Discouragingly, it relies heavily on a very method-
ologically weak survey of Arizona State University psychology students
whose parents had divorced to support a position that relocation is detri-
mental. In addition, to support a suggestion that a court's denial of a
relocation request would result in a custodial parent not moving in a
majority of cases, it relies on a survey of seventy-two family law attor-
neys who happened to be attending a continuing legal education pro-
114. Id. at 87.
115. Id. at 109.
116. Id. at 85.
117. Baures v. Lewis, 770 A.2d 214 (N.J. 2001); Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y.
1996). See Sanford L. Braver et al., Relocation of Children After Divorce and Children's Best
Interests: New Evidence and Legal Considerations, 17 J. FAM. PsycH. 206, 210 (2003) (noting
that the social science articles cited in Baures are, with one minor exception, the same as those
cited in Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 112); see also Janet Leach Richards, Children's Rights
vs. Parents' Rights: A Proposed Solution to the Custodial Relocation Conundrum, 29 N.M. L.
REv. 245, 259-60 (1999).
118. In re Marriage of LaMusga, 88 P.3d 81 (Cal. 2004).
119. Amici Curiae Brief of Richard A. Warshak et al. on behalf of LaMusga Children at 15, In
re Marriage of LaMusga, 88 P.3d 81 (Cal. 2004) (No. S 107355), available at http://www.atybrief
case.com/volexports-lamusga/warshak-brief.pdf. The amici on the Warshak brief are eighteen
social science researchers and ten mental health forensic practitioners. The other brief was
authored by Judith Wallerstein, who was joined by five mental health professionals.
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gram and were willing to fill out a fifteen minute questionnaire! 2 °
Further, the brief supports the recommendations of the one expert in the
case on what outcome was in the children's best interests, without noting
that "best interests" is an indeterminate legal standard that goes beyond
the knowledge of the expert.1 21
Briefs filed by social science organizations, such as the American
Psychological Association (APA), have been criticized as well. Criti-
cisms of briefs have included a selective use of theories to support a
particular position, acceptance of one party's version of disputed facts,
and incomplete review of the research.122 Even the critics, however, are
in favor of organizations such as the APA submitting briefs and feel the
briefs can "make an important contribution to the legal process." ''"3
Indeed, the APA has been praised for being one of the few professional
associations of social scientists that routinely submits amicus briefs.' 4 .
A better approach would be to have social scientists, who are com-
mitted to being as unbiased as possible, author briefs on family law
issues. Absolute neutrality is an unobtainable goal, since there is bias in
the formation of research questions, the conduct of research, and the
review of research. 125 However, bias in research and research reviews
can be reduced. The brief writer, like the writer of a research review,
should clearly indicate the purpose of the brief and the methodology
used to select studies, and should assess their substantive findings and
methodological characteristics. 126 The research used in the brief should
be judged by its quality, the relation of quality to findings, and its rele-
vance to the policy questions being addressed. 127  The brief writer
should ask peers to review the brief. It has been proposed that profes-
sional journals give amicus briefs priority in publication so that the
briefs authors would be aware that peer review would be forthcoming,
120. Id. at 15-16 (citing Sanford L. Braver et al., Relocation of Children After Divorce and
Children's Best Interests: New Evidence and Legal Considerations, 17 J. FAM. PSYCH. 206
(2003) and Sanford L. Braver et al., Experiences of Family Law Attorneys with Current Issues in
Divorce Practice, 51 FAM. REL. 325 (2002)).
121. Id. at 18-21. For discussion of expert testifying to the ultimate issue, see infra Part
III.A.4.
122. Gerald V. Barrett & Scott B. Morris, The American Psychological Association's Amicus
Curiae Brief in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: The Values of Science Versus the Values of the
Law, 17 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 201 (1993).
123. Id. at 202.
124. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note I 11, at 153. A list of APA briefs is available at http://
www.psyclaw.org.
125. See infra Part IV; Ramsey & Kelly, supra note 10, at 671 (noting that bias can be
reduced, but not eliminated).
126. Ramsey & Kelly, supra note 10, at 682.
127. Id. at 682-83.
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even if it did not occur prior to the submission of a brief to a court. 28
These briefs should concern themselves with the issues of scientific
method discussed in Part IV and they should model themselves on scien-
tific literature reviews, also briefly discussed in Part IV. 129 In our con-
clusion (Part V), we suggest how courts might obtain higher quality
research review briefs.
C. Judicial Notice
The distinction made by Professor Kenneth Culp Davis in the
1940's between "adjudicative facts" and "legislative facts" is still used
today to define appropriate content for judicial notice. 3 ° Adjudicative
facts were those that the court found "concerning the immediate parties -
what the parties did, what the circumstances were." 131 When a court,
however, "wrestles with a question of law or policy, it is acting legisla-
tively ... and the facts which inform its legislative judgment may con-
veniently be denominated legislative facts." 13 2
The Davis adjudicative fact/legislative fact dichotomy has been
maintained in the Federal Rules of Evidence with regard to judicial
notice. Rule 201 strictly limits the judicial notice of adjudicative facts,
but does not apply to the judicial notice of legislative facts. Relying
heavily on Davis' work, the Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of
Evidence distinguished between adjudicative and legislative facts as
follows:
Adjudicative facts are simply the facts of the particular case. Legisla-
tive facts, on the other hand, are those which have relevance to legal
reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in the formulation of a
legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in the enactment of a
legislative body. '33
Concerning adjudicative facts, under Rule 201 "[a] judicially noticed
fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1)
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2)
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."'' 34
128. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 11l, at 211.
129. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
130. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative
Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364 (1942).
131. Id. at 402.
132. Id.
133. FED. R. EvID. 201 advisory committee's note, subdivision (a).
134. FED. R. Evlo. 201(b), Kinds of Facts. Federal Rule of Evidence 201 further provides:
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not.
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and
supplied with the necessary information.
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In contrast to the restraints on adjudicative facts, the Rules do not
restrain judicial notice of legislative facts and, in fact, the Advisory
Committee endorsed a broad based authority to consider legislative
facts. The committee quoted with approval a law review article by Pro-
fessor Morgan:
In determining the content or applicability of a rule of domestic law,
the judge is unrestricted in his investigation and conclusion. He may
reject the propositions of either party or of both parties. He may con-
sult the sources of pertinent data to which they refer, or he may refuse
to do so. He may make an independent search for persuasive data or
rest content with what he has or what the parties present . [T]he
parties do no more than to assist; they control no part of the
process.' 35
The Advisory Committee's Note goes on to state:
This is the view which should govern judicial access to legislative
facts. It renders inappropriate any limitation in the form of indisputa-
bility, any formal requirements of notice other than those already
inherent in affording opportunity to hear and be heard and exchang-
ing briefs, and any requirement of formal findings at any level.136
Our focus is on the use of social science research, but courts may con-
sider history, science, and other materials "for informing the court's leg-
islative judgment on questions of law and policy."' 37
This broad access to judicial notice of legislative facts in the family
law area may create confusion and unfairness. The distinction between
legislative and adjudicative facts is not always clear and this problem is
exacerbated when the judge, not a jury, is the factfinder. To illustrate
the difficulty of distinguishing between adjudicative and legislative
facts, consider the following hypothetical case:
Because of her mother's incarceration, Ann went to live with Jane,
her mother's sister, when Ann was age one. Jane became Ann's legal
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon timely request to an
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of
the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request may be made
after judicial notice has been taken.
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the
proceeding.
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury
to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal case, the court shall
instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact
judicially noticed.
FED. R. EvIo. 201(c)-(g).
135. FED. R. Evio. 201 advisory committee's note (quoting Edmund J.Morgan, Judicial
Notice, 57 HAiv. L. REV. 269, 270-71 (1944)).
136. FED. R. Evm. 201 advisory committee's note.
137. Davis, supra note 130, at 404.
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guardian and custodian. Ann has lived with Jane for seven years. The
mother has now been released from prison, but Jane has refused to
return Ann. Assume that the court must determine custody based on
"the best interests of the child." Assume further that:
1. The court-appointed child psychologist evaluates Ann, Jane,
and the mother and provides an extensive written evaluation, which is
entered into evidence, and has given expert testimony at trial about
Ann's emotional well-being and the parenting abilities of Jane and the
mother.
2. There are child development theories and studies related to the
impact of parent-child bonding and attachment, psychological parents,
and connection with blood relatives on the child's well-being, but there
is some dispute in the field about the conclusions to be drawn from these
studies. The judge is familiar with this literature in a general way, but
the theories and empirical work testing those theories are not addressed
by the expert's testimony.
3. The judge, not a jury, will determine the facts and decide the
case by analyzing the law related to custody and best interests in relation
to the facts of this case and will decide who should have custody.
Based on this hypothetical, can the judge take judicial notice of the
material in paragraph two, namely child development theories and stud-
ies related to the impact on children's well-being of parent-child bond-
ing and attachment, psychological parents, and connection with blood
relatives? There are four potentially correct answers.
The judge may be able to take judicial notice of the studies because
this is part of the court's consideration of legislative facts, relevant to
"the lawmaking process," as the material will help the judge reach a
general rule of law related to balancing the claims of a biological parent
and those of a primary caretaker, in relation to the well-being of the
child.
On the other hand, these studies could be viewed as adjudicative
facts that are specific to this case, which should not be judicially noticed.
The judge can take judicial notice only if the facts are not subject to
reasonable dispute. In this situation, according to the hypothetical case,
there is some dispute over the meaning of these studies. Further, it is
likely that there would be even more disagreement about how the judge
applied the studies to the situation of the parties.
Another possibility is that the judge could take judicial notice of the
studies for some purposes, but not for others. If the judge uses the
research as background information when the judge formulates a general
rule of law, the research materials would be legislative facts, appropriate
for judicial notice. The same facts, however, would be adjudicative
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facts if the judge weighs them in deciding this case. The judge must rely
on the parties to provide the adjudicative facts and therefore must
instruct herself to disregard the paragraph two materials to the extent
that they are not part of the record, if she uses the studies as an adjudica-
tive fact.13
8
Alternatively, the judge could conclude that judicial notice is not an
issue. In designing and conducting the evaluation, in producing the
report, and in testifying, the expert was using the material in paragraph
two. If the parties wanted to challenge that material or make it more
explicit, they had the opportunity. The judge may therefore use the par-
agraph two material as the judge sees fit.
This example illustrates the difficulty in applying these judicial
notice rules to many family law cases. The rules of evidence may be
more relaxed and more often than not there is no jury, hence the judge is
both a fact-finder and a decision-maker. 139 The distinction between leg-
islative and adjudicative facts is thus a matter of degree, rather than a
bright line.' 4 °
Another substantial problem with a court taking judicial notice of
138. Michael J. Saks, Judicial Attention to the Way the World Works, 75 IOWA L. REv. 1011,
1017-18 (1990) (noting that "[t]he facts labeled 'adjudicative' and 'legislative' may be identical,"
and "[t]he legal function they serve determines what we call them and what courts may or must do
with them").
139. Consider, for example, a family court judge as the fact-finder, proceeding through the
processes Professors Monahan and Walker envision for the use of "social frameworks" in court.
They propose that information on social frameworks would come to the court through briefs filed
by the parties or from the court's own research. The judge would evaluate the social science to
determine if use of the framework was proper. If the court approved the social science, the court
would then communicate its empirical conclusion as a jury instruction, just as the court would
communicate its conclusion on the substantive law. The framework instruction would address the
following four aspects of the court's empirical conclusions: "the factual determination that is
being framed or put in context for the jury by the research;" "the factors (or 'variables') found in
the research that bear upon the determination that the jury is to make;" "the form of the
relationship that exists between or among the identified factors;" and "the magnitude of the
relationship that is addressed in the empirical framework." Social Frameworks, supra note 18, at
595.
140. Kenneth C. Davis proposed the following distinction:
When facts used in lawmaking are (1) narrow and specific, (2) central or critical, (3)
controversial, (4) unmixed with judgment or policy, (5) provable, and (6) in some
degree about the parties or known mainly by them, the parties clearly should have a
pre-decision chance to challenge them, and the requirement may even be imposed in
the name of due process. But when the facts are (1) broad and general, (2)
background or peripheral, (3) noncontroversial, (4) mixed with judgment or policy,
(5) not easily provable, and (6) wholly unrelated to the parties, a court or agency
may use them without even adverting to any possible problem of procedural
fairness. When the six items are mixed - some at one end of the scale, some at the
other, some toward the middle - the two questions of how much support the facts
should have and of what procedural protections to give the parties may be difficult.
Kenneth Culp Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 931, 933 (1980).
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social science to formulate a general rule of law is that a party may have
no opportunity to challenge the court's assessment of social science.
Judges obtain knowledge from a variety of sources, such as judicial
training programs, books, magazines, television, public lectures, and
interaction with friends, colleagues, and family. These off-the-record
sources of information can be problematic if judges then use this infor-
mation as determinative facts in forming their opinions, with no advance
notice to the parties. A startling example of the parties being unaware
that the judge had taken judicial notice of facts that would be used in the
decision was identified by Professor (formally judge) Peggy Davis:
Ross v. Hoffman illustrates both the haphazard way in which extra-
record literature infects judicial decisionmaking and the reluctance of
judges to control the process. The trial judge's deliberations pro-
ceeded as follows:
After reviewing the evidence adduced by the parties, the chan-
cellor [who had decided this custody matter below] explained
that his reasoning had, to some extent, been influenced by cer-
tain educational background factors to which he had been
exposed extra-judicially, as that term applies to the evidentiary
confines of this case. He said: "Now, very briefly, there is a
book out, which is widely read, by three very well-respected
professional doctors, Drs. Goldstein, Freud and Solnick [sic],
called 'Beyond the Best Interests of the Child' and in that book
they point out that whether any adult becomes a psychological
parent over the child is based upon a day-to-day interaction,
companionship and shared experiences. And if you look at it
from that view, Mrs. Hoffman has had this advantage."
On appeal, Ross complained about the chancellor's reliance
upon psychological parent theory, arguing that she had had no notice
that the theory was at issue and no opportunity to refute it. Interme-
diate and ultimate appellate courts both dismissed her protest. These
courts found "no error in the fact that a trial judge continues his gen-
eral education by reading, or that his reasoning is influenced by such
education or by his experiences during his lifetime."' 41
What's to be done about these judicial notice concerns? Professor
Davis suggested that:
Some device is needed to focus the attention of judges and litigants
upon the possibility that background and legislative fact issues will
arise; to encourage judges and litigants to address these issues
directly rather than leave them sub rosa; and to suggest, in broad
outline, means for assuring that judicial notice is undertaken in a
manner that assures fairness and informed deliberation. The laissez-
faire policy with respect to judicial notice of background and legisla-
141. Davis, supra note 9, at 1595-97.
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tive facts has failed. Rules of evidence should meet this important
issue with something other than silence. 4 2
She proposes that the court's judicial notice authority be explicitly
recognized and that the court's authority to "entertain or solicit special
briefs, argument, affidavits or depositions of experts, or, in the rare case,
hearings, as to the propriety of taking judicial notice of a disputable
fact" be codified. 14 3  Further, she recommends that "[a] trial court's
decision whether to exercise this authority should be reviewable and
informed by standards.""'
Davis' approach has much in common with suggestions made by
Federal District Court Judge Jack Weinstein. Judge Weinstein suggests
that "[t]he key in this area is openness and balance. Whenever possible,
materials and notices of work and studies should be filed and docketed
or announced at sessions with the attorneys and experts. Parties must
have the opportunity to counter these extra-judicial sources of knowl-
edge." '1 45 He further suggests that:
Encouraging and allowing judges to learn as much as they can about
the world, their craft and the cases before them is desirable. Some
limits and caveats are required to give the parties a fair opportunity to
meet the judges' possible misperceptions and to assure the public of
an unbiased and fair minded judiciary.' 46
To implement these recommendations, Judge Weinstein's suggestions
142. Id. at 1603 (footnotes omitted). Professor Davis' article was criticized by Saks, supra
note 138. His criticism, for the most part, does not really address the questions she raised. He
notes that "the peculiar class of cases" that she studied do not tell us much about what judges do
generally with certain uses of social science; this may be true, but unfortunately his analysis does
not tell us much about how to deal with judicial notice in these "peculiar" cases-namely family
law cases. Saks, supra note 138, at 1025.
143. Davis, supra note 9, at 1603.
144. Id.
145. Jack B. Weinstein, Limits on Judges Learning, Speaking and Acting-Part I-Tentative First
Thoughts: How Many Judges Learn?, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 539, 560 (1994). See also Judge
Weinstein's decision in Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D.N.Y.
1981). In Bulova he decided "[iun view of the extensive judicial notice taken, based partly upon
the court's own research," to issue a preliminary memorandum and invite the parties to be heard
on the "'propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed' upon motion made
within ten days." Bulova, 508 F. Supp. at 1328. Judge Weinstein suggested that "inviting parties
to participate in such ongoing colloquy has the advantage of reducing the possibility of egregious
errors by the court and increases the probability that the parties may believe they were fairly
treated, even if some of them are dissatisfied with the result." Id. He noted that:
This procedure complies with the spirit of Rule 2 0 1(e) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. .. 'A party is entitled upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard as
to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed. In the
absence of prior notification, the request may be made after judicial notice has been
taken.'
Id.
146. Weinstein, supra note 145, at 565.
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include that judicial education programs be provided by neutral or bal-
anced sources and that judges' participation in these programs be
disclosed.
Even more importantly, judges themselves must scrutinize the
extra-judicial social science material they are considering. The judicial
gate-keeping function should be employed not just with experts, but
with judicial notice as well.
Generally, courts should be hesitant to take judicial notice of social
science research at the case-specific and intermediate levels, because
social science findings typically should not be considered "indisputa-
ble," and further, there could be disagreement about the connection
between the research and the facts of the case.
With our analyses of the way social science research is accessed
and used by the courts as a context, we turn to a discussion of standards
that judges may employ in assessing social science research. These
standards are based in the scientific method and are consistent with
Daubert.
IV. GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSING THE VALIDITY OF
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
In this part we describe the scientific method in general and its
application to social science research on families. In the context of this
analysis, we propose and discuss a set of standards that judges may
employ when they must assess social science in deciding cases and
developing law. These standards are needed because judges often have
no expertise in evaluating science-based claims.14 7 Because the stan-
dards are explicitly tied to family law, they help to bridge that knowl-
edge gap.
As discussed in Part III, social science research findings may come
to the courts from several sources: expert testimony, briefs, and judicial
notice. In addition to different sources of social science, it is also impor-
tant to identify two different types of social science claims that courts
may consider.
In the first type of claim, which might be referred to as a direct
research claim, an expert witness, a brief, a book, an article, or a speaker
makes direct reference to findings from a particular study or body of
social science literature. For example, in a child protection hearing, it
might be claimed that research has shown that family preservation pro-
grams have beneficial impacts on children and family functioning. In
assessing this claim, as we argue below, the judge should inquire into
147. See, e.g., Saks, supra note 6, at 230.
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whether the scientific method was applied properly to the production of
the family preservation research that is cited.'
48
The second type of social science claim is less direct and may be
referred to as a science-based practice claim. In this instance, an expert,
who may or may not be a social scientist, proffers information to the
court, usually about a specific party in the case, that is formed from the
expert's use of an assessment or clinical strategy based on scientific
literature. For example, a clinical social worker or a psychologist may
have conducted a custody evaluation and in the course of the evaluation,
used one or more assessment instruments for the child or parents. In
doing so, there is a claim that the custody evaluation strategy is based on
research, that the assessment instruments have been produced and tested
scientifically and, therefore, that the expert's evaluation has scientific
validity. In this instance, the judge should inquire as to whether the
assessment strategies and instruments employed have in fact been pro-
duced scientifically. 14
9
The key question that motivates the analysis in this section is:
When a court has information before it that claims social scientific sta-
tus, what standards should the court bring to bear in assessing the valid-
ity of this claim? We propose that regardless of the form or nature of
the claim, the court should evaluate it according to standards of the sci-
entific method and come to conclusions in compliance with these stan-
dards.' ° Our proposal is in accord with Daubert, which calls upon
judges to ask four questions of any scientific information proffered to
the court by expert witnesses. These questions relate to the scientific
method and the scientific community that employs this method. 5 1 Para-
phrased, the questions are as follows:
148. Note that this analysis should also be applied to claims that make no explicit reference to
any studies, but have the imprimatur of "science," because they are proposed by someone who has
expert credentials and wants the work accepted as "science." The book, BEYOND Ta BEST
INTEREST OF THE CHILD, GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 9, would be an example of this type of
claim. The authors, respected clinicians, did not indicate the basis for their claims, which
presumably were formulated from their clinical practices. The book has been highly criticized
both for its conclusions and for its lack of attention to scientific method. See Davis, supra note 9;
see also, e.g., Daniel Katkin et al., Above and Beyond the Best Interests of the Child: An Inquiry
into the Relationship Between Social Science and Social Action, 8 LAW & Soc. REV. 669 (1974);
Peter L. Strauss & Joanna B. Strauss, Book Review, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 996 (1974) (reviewing
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD, & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1973)).
149. See infra Part IV.B.1.
150. For example, Conley & Peterson, supra note 67, at 1186, argue that Daubert calls upon
the court to determine whether "the work of the expert follows the cannons of the scientific
method."
151. Daubert requires this analysis for expert testimony. We propose that the same analysis
should be applied to other sources of social science as well. See infra Part V.
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1. Can the scientific claim be empirically tested and has it been
empirically tested?
2. What is the error rate of the methods or techniques used to test
the claim, i.e., how valid are the methods employed in the
study or research literature?
3. Has the scientific claim been subjected to peer review and
publication?
4. Has the claim achieved general acceptance in the scientific
community? 52
While our discussion in this section does not explicitly track the four
Daubert questions, we do address each of them in the context of our
broader discussion of the standards for assessing the validity of social
science research.
At its core, the scientific method consists of three interacting sys-
tems: a system of logic for developing and empirically testing hypothe-
ses and building theory; a system of methodological standards that
scientific disciplines employ to guide the research practices used to test
hypotheses; and a system of community socialization, review, and com-
munication practices that train, police, and coordinate the work of
diverse scientists in the day-to-day practice of science. 53 The scientific
method, as it functions, may be conceived of as an ongoing and vast
filtering system of claims to scientific knowledge with each of these
three systems constituting a level of filtration.' 54 Below, we describe
each of these systems and how it operates in the social sciences with
special reference to family and child research.' 55 Based in this descrip-
tion and analysis, Table 2 sets forth validity questions linked to each
level of filtration that jointly constitute the scientific method. It is our
hope that the table will be a helpful tool for judges and other legal actors
concerned with evaluating social science information proffered to the
courts.
TABLE 2: QUESTIONS SPECIFIC TO THREE SUB-SYSTEMS OF THE
SCIENTIFIC METHOD THAT JUDGES SHOULD ASK IN
CONSIDERING FAMILY SOCIAL SCIENCE
SYSTEM I: THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE
152. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993).
153. See FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 12, for an analysis that also covers these three systems
of the scientific method.
154. For a discussion of the scientific method as a set of filters, see Henry H. Bauer, How
Science Really Works, in SCIENTIFIC LITERACY AND THE MYTH OF THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD
(1992).
155. This section substantially updates and provides a more systematic elaboration of themes
discussed in Ramsey & Kelly, supra note 10.
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• Has the logical system of scientific inference been followed in the produc-
tion of the information before the court?
" Is the information the result of empirical testing of falsifiable hypotheses?
SYSTEM II: METHODOLOGICAL DESIGN AND ANALYSIS STANDARDS
1. Measurement Validity
" Have the measures used in the research been validated in the study itself or
in prior research?
• Have multiple, validated measures of key variables been used in the
research?
" Have experts in measurement, e.g. psychometricians, been consulted where
there is doubt concerning measurement validity?
2. Internal Validity and Causal Inference
" Have rigorous designs that ensure high levels of internal validity (the con-
trolling of rival hypotheses) been employed in the research before the
court?
• Has the research employed well-designed control groups?
" Have experts in research design been consulted where there is doubt con-
cerning internal validity?
3. External Validity: Sampling, Generalizing, and Fit Between Research and
Legal Applications
• Has a random sampling method been used in the research before the court
or has a non-random sampling method, such as convenience sampling,
been employed?
• If sampling has been employed, what is the response rate?
" If a longitudinal sample has been employed, what is the attrition rate?
• Has the magnitude of problems associated with low response rates and/or
high attrition rates been established? Have efforts been made to correct for
bias created by response rate or attrition rate problems?
" Is there a strong correspondence between the samples or populations used
in the study before the court and the legal issues and case being considered
by the court?
" Have experts in sample design and execution been consulted where there is
doubt concerning sampling and generalizing?
4. Analytic Validity
• Is there an appropriate match between the data used in the research and the
analytic methods applied to the data?
" Have the analytic techniques used in the research been applied appropri-
ately?
" Have the results of the analysis used in the research been properly inter-
preted?
• Have reference manuals geared to judicial practice, such as the Federal
Judicial Center's Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, been consulted
to address analytic validity questions?
• Have experts, such as applied statisticians, been consulted where there is
doubt concerning analytic validity?
SYSTEM III: SOCIAL PRACTICE OF SCIENCE
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1. Community Socialization
To what degree do the social scientists who have authored the research in
question possess professional records indicating training and continuing
education consistent with the community socialization standards of their
discipline?
2. Peer Review
" Has the research successfully passed peer review?
• What is the exact nature of the peer review process used to assess the
research under consideration by the court?
3. Scientific Communication
" Has the research proffered to the court as scientific appeared in a reputable
scientific publication?
• Have the results of research considered by the court been independently
replicated?
" Is the data set upon which the research is based available to other research-
ers for re-analysis?
" Has the research been placed in the context of a synthetic review of
research literatures on relevant issues?
A. The Logic of Scientific Inference and Progress: Empirical Testing
Science is in the business of developing general systems of causal
statements about how the world around us operates.' 56 A statement that
outlines a suspected causal relationship between two measurable dimen-
sions of the empirical world is called a hypothesis, and the dimensions
themselves are called variables.157 A suspected cause is called an inde-
pendent variable, and a suspected effect is called a dependent varia-
ble.'15  A social scientific hypothesis concerning families and a legal
structure, such as joint physical custody, for example, could be:
Children in joint physical custody arrangements subsequent to
divorce experience fewer divorce-related negative impacts on their
well-being than children in sole custody arrangements.
In this hypothesis, joint custody versus sole physical custody is the inde-
pendent variable and the child's well-being is the dependent variable.
Systems of interrelated hypotheses that together seek to explain a
substantial portion of empirical reality are called theories. ' 9 For exam-
ple, in developmental psychology, a set of hypotheses jointly constitutes
attachment theory, which seeks to explain the relationship between early
parent-child interactions and the child's development of later-life
156. See, e.g., LACHMAN, supra note 12, at 85.
157. See RODNEY STARK & LYNNE ROBERTS, CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL RESEARCH METHODS 13
(2d ed. 1998).
158. Id. at 99.
159. For similar statements on the nature of scientific theory, see LACHMAN, supra note 12, at
49-56; STARK & ROBERTS, supra note 157, at 9-12.
[Vol. 59:1
20041 SOCIAL SCIENCE KNOWLEDGE IN FAMILY LAW CASES 39
competencies.160
Thus far we have focused on definitions. Now, we turn to the
underlying logic of science. Karl Popper, a leading twentieth-century
epistemologist of science, whose thinking is widely cited by practicing
scientists, argues that the business of science is not the production of a
system of lasting truths, but rather the building of strong theories
through the logical process of falsification. 61 While other philosophers
and historians of science, such as Thomas Kuhn, and other theories of
science, such as social constructivism, have challenged Popper's
views, 62 Popper's influence in law has increased due to Daubert's reli-
ance on the concept of falsification. 163
For Popper, falsification is the dynamo underlying science. The
process works in the following way. First, a hypothesis is developed.
Scientists may produce hypotheses from any number of sources. For
example, hypotheses may be logical derivations of existing theories or
they may be new in their derivation. What is key is not so much the
source of the hypotheses, but rather what is done with the individual
hypothesis. Second, for Popper and for virtually all scientists, after
hypotheses are derived they must next be empirically tested through
well-controlled research designs (what we mean by a well-controlled
research design is the subject of the next subsection). No matter how
compelling or elegantly derived the theory, if there is no empirical test-
ing, there is no science. Abiding by this theory, the Supreme Court in
Daubert was clearly following Popper in posing its first question: Has
the scientific claim been empirically tested?
The next step in Popper's logic of science concerns the nature of
the inferences that may be made based on the results of the empirical
test(s) of the hypothesis. Recall that hypotheses are general claims
about suspected causal relationships in the system of empirical reality
that is the purview of the study. When the empirical results of a study
testing a hypothesis are known, the scientist and the scientific commu-
160. Robert F. Kelly & Shawn Ward, Allocating Custodial Responsibilities at Divorce: Social
Science Research and the American Law Institute's Approximation Rule, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 350
(2002).
161. KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1968). For a more contemporary
statement of Popper's view of science and the dynamics of falsification that is geared to a legal
audience, see Jan Beyea & Daniel Berger, Scientific Misconceptions Among Daubert
Gatekeepers: The Need for Reform of Expert Review Procedures, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
327 (2001); see also, generally, FoSTER & HUItER, supra note 12, ch. 3, at 37-68.
162. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF ScIErrnIIC REVOLUTIONS (1962); KARIN D.
KNORR-CETINA, THE MANUFACTURE OF KNOWLEDGE: AN ESSAY ON THE CONSTRUCTIVIST AND
CONTEXTUAL NATURE OF SCIENCE (1981). See also critics cited supra note 14.
163. STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE, A JUDGE'S DESKBOOK ON THE BASIC PHILOSOPHIES AND
METHODS OF SCIENCE 28 (1999).
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nity want to know how the empirical results relate to the hypothesis that
was tested. Popper argues that in a strict sense, empirical results can
only tell us if the hypothesis was falsified; we can never know with
certainty if the hypothesis is true in the same way that a mathematical
proof is true. To understand why this is the case, it is important to con-
sider the types of results that an empirical test might yield. If the results
are negative, i.e. the direction of the relationship between the indepen-
dent and dependent variables runs in the opposite direction of the result
predicted by the hypothesis, or if the results show no relationship
between the independent and dependent variables, then the hypothesis
has been falsified. This is so because we have found an empirical case
that negates the general assertion of the hypothesis.
But what if the results of the study testing the hypothesis are posi-
tive, that is, the relationship predicted by the hypothesis is indeed found
to exist empirically? With such results Popper argues that we cannot say
that the hypothesis has been verified. We can only say that it has not
been falsified. This is the case because the hypothesis is a general state-
ment, meant to apply to all relevant cases, but the empirical test con-
cerned only the specific cases studied. Hence, it is logically indefensible
to generalize from the particular to the general or universal. The most
that we can assert based on a positive result from an empirical test of a
hypothesis is that the hypothesis has been supported. We cannot say
that the hypothesis is true.
This is an important insight because it runs counter to many popu-
lar conceptions of science, which suggest that there is such a thing as
scientific truth. In reality, the scientific knowledge of any historical
moment should be viewed as tentative and humble knowledge for two
reasons: first, because scientific knowledge is based on tests that can
only falsify and not verify, and second, because the scientific commu-
nity is always in the process of conducting tests of new hypotheses that
may falsify or supercede current theory. There is, however, an impor-
tant distinction to be made. While it is true that science by definition
cannot produce enduring truths, it is also true science has been the
source of major advances in knowledge of the empirical world. Indeed,
the ability of science to make progress in the production of knowledge is
premised on the very system of logic that prevents it from the claiming
of enduring truths.
Judges may draw two conclusions from this brief discussion of the
logic of the scientific method. First, science requires the empirical test-
ing of hypotheses and theories. If a theory or hypothesis is proffered as
scientific and it cannot or has not been empirically tested, it cannot be
considered to be scientific. Hence, judges constantly need to inquire as
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to the empirical grounds upon which any scientific claim is based. The
following are two illustrations of how this standard might operate.
* An expert witness or brief makes a direct research claim that
foster care generally has negative consequences on the well-
being of children. This assertion should reference an empirical
research literature indicating that this relationship has been well-
tested and supported.
* A clinical social worker makes the science-based practice claim
in a custody proceeding that a child exhibits parental alienation
syndrome (PAS). As a first step in determining admissibility, the
judge should inquire whether studies in which PAS is an inde-
pendent or dependent variable have been conducted and whether
the results of the studies support the claim that PAS is a useful
descriptive or diagnostic category. 164
Second, judges need to be aware of the tentative nature of scientific
knowledge. Because the logic of falsification is at the heart of science,
certainty with respect to the standing of a hypothesis or theory can never
be complete. Furthermore, because the process of falsification is ongo-
ing, judges need to be sensitive to the nature of scientific knowledge as a
constantly evolving body of empirically based theory. As a result of this
constant process of theory revision, there is relatively little "black letter"
science. 165
Rigorous empirical testing is at the core of the logic of falsification.
If an empirical test of a hypothesis is not rigorous, its results might be
used either to incorrectly falsify or to incorrectly support a hypothesis.
Hence, the scientific method consists not simply of the logic of falsifica-
tion, but also of a set of methodological standards that guide the empiri-
cal testing of hypotheses. We next turn our attention to the
methodological standards by which the empirical testing of hypotheses
are judged by the scientific community, for it is with these standards that
164. Such studies might involve tests of models of hypothesized factors that predict the onset
of PAS or models which test hypothesized impacts of PAS. For critical assessments of PAS, see
the special issue of the Family Court Review dedicated to Alienated Children in Divorce, 39 FAM.
CT. REV. 246 (2001) and Janet R. Johnston & Joan B. Kelly, Rejoinder to Gardner's
"Commentary on Kelly & Johnson's 'The Alienated Child: A Reformulation of Parental
Alienation Syndrome,"' 42 FAM. CT. REV. 622 (2004). See infra text accompanying notes 211-12.
On the issue of judges accepting PAS diagnoses in custody proceedings addressed in the same
special issue of Family Court Review, see especially R. James Williams, Should Judges Close the
Gate on PAS and PA?, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 267 (2001).
165. Popper's logic of scientific inference is not relevant to the work practiced by all scientists.
For example, some fields of science are highly descriptive and concerned more with improving
measurement than with testing hypotheses. Hence, it is probably best to limit Popper's
falsification logic to scientific statements that seek to test causal relationships that have been
posed as hypotheses. In Part IV.B., we explicitly treat the question of scientific measurement and
the assessment of its validity.
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judges must also be conversant in their evaluations of social scientific
information.
B. Methodological Standards of Design and Analysis
There are four standards that scientists generally seek to meet in
carrying out their own empirical research and in judging the research of
others. Problems related to any of the standards raise the question of
what may be called a methods effect or bias in the research design and
analysis. As we have noted, the logic of scientific inference is premised
on the assumption that valid empirical tests of hypotheses have actually
taken place.16 6 Such testing involves two steps: the implementation of a
research design to collect the necessary empirical data and the subse-
quent analysis of the data through which hypotheses are tested. When
judges consider whether proffered information has been produced by the
scientific method, they necessarily must inquire into the degree to which
methodological standards of validity in research design and analysis
were maintained.
It is with these standards that the Supreme Court was most likely
concerned when it instructed judges to ask: What is the error rate of the
methods used to test the claim, i.e., how valid are the methods employed
in the study or research literature?.67 In this section, we discuss four
crucial methodological standards in turn: measurement validity, internal
validity, external validity, and analytic validity. While the design and
analysis standards do not vary from discipline to discipline, the manner
in which they are implemented does vary due to the differences in the
nature of the empirical system that each scientific discipline studies.
Because our concern is with social science research, particularly
research related to families and children, we focus on the ways in which
social scientists seek to conduct their research in a manner consistent
with the four standards and on the challenges that they encounter in
doing so. In this section we address the standards themselves, while in
the next section, Part IV.C., we consider the social processes used by the
scientific community to oversee the use of the standards.
1. MEASUREMENT VALIDITY
Because the scientific method requires that theoretical hypotheses
166. POPPER, supra note 161.
167. In Daubert, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that "the court ordinarily should consider the
known or potential rate of error.. .and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the
technique's operation." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (citations
omitted). While the Court's wording is somewhat ambiguous, we interpret and paraphrase this
statement to mean that courts need to be concerned with the degree to which scientific standards
have been maintained with respect to techniques or methods used to test hypotheses.
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relating independent and dependent variables be tested empirically, it is
necessary to design and implement strategies for measuring these and
other variables. The development of empirical measures for theoretical
variables is called operationalization.168 Just as a physicist must clearly
specify how to measure weight or pressure for the purpose of a study, so
too would a social scientist studying the impacts of divorce on children's
well-being need to carefully specify how various dimensions of chil-
dren's well-being would be measured. The standard against which
social scientists assess these strategies is called measurement validity
and it simply refers to the ability of a given measurement strategy to
measure what it intends to measure.' 69 Measurement validity is a neces-
sary condition for all scientific research because without it subsequent
stages in the research process, such as data analysis and hypotheses test-
ing, become suspect. Various methods have been developed for enhanc-
ing and assessing measurement validity. Below we focus on the logic
behind these methods, rather than the technical aspects of specific
methods.
Measuring human social systems is extremely difficult because
human social systems are complex and changing realities. Further, ethi-
cal and practical concerns, as well as the willingness of subjects to par-
ticipate in studies, often limit the level of access that social scientists
have to subjects for purposes of measurement. Each of these difficulties
is heightened further when the study seeks to measure family and child
behaviors due to the sensitivity of such behaviors. How is a judge to
know if social science research proffered to the court has employed
valid measurement strategies? Below, we discuss two measurement
issues with which courts should be concerned in making such
assessments.
a. The Need for Empirically Validated Measurement Systems
As we have noted, two sorts of social science-based claims may be
proffered to courts dealing with family and child matters: direct
research claims and science-based practice claims. In each instance,
under Daubert, the court would need to determine whether the measure-
ment system used had been validated scientifically. A direct research
claim, for example, might involve a researcher who measures the vari-
ables of parental conflict and children's well-being as part of a study of
168. Donald T. Campbell, Definitional versus Multiple Operationism, in METHODOLOGY AND
EPISTEMOLOGY FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE: SELECTED PAPERS 31-36 (E. Samuel Overman ed., 1998).
169. For general discussions of measurement validity, see STARK & ROBERTS, supra note 157,
at 46-49; MARY J. ALLEN & WENDY M. YEN, INTRODUCTION TO MEASUREMENT THEORY
(Lawrence S. Wrightsman ed., 1979).
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the consequences of divorce on children, and that researcher's study is
later cited to a court in a disputed custody case. A science-based prac-
tice claim might involve a parental custodial fitness assessment by a
forensic psychologist submitted to the court as part of a disputed custody
proceeding that contains a recommendation based in part on results
derived from instruments designed to assess parental custodial compe-
tence. In each of these examples, part of the court's assessment of the
proffered information would necessarily include an assessment of
whether the measurement system used in the production of either type of
information is scientifically valid.. Before addressing how the court
would assess measurement validity in cases such as these, it is useful to
describe how the social sciences generally assess measurement validity.
In the social sciences, and indeed in all sciences, establishing mea-
surement validity is a collective, community-based process that unfolds
over time. Measurement systems in the social sciences may take many
forms. For example, where some measurement systems rely upon obser-
vational methods such as clinical assessments, others may call upon
knowledgeable individuals such as teachers to describe and rate another
individual. Still others rely on self-reports to interviewers or on ques-
tionnaires, while others may require subjects to perform tasks that are
scored. When a new measure is fielded for the first time, measurement
theory requires that a series of well-known validity tests be performed to
determine the validity of the new measure. 70 The purpose of most tests
of measurement validity is to determine (a) whether the new measure
gives consistent results when applied to the same or similar subjects
under the same conditions (reliability). 7 1 and (b) whether the new mea-
sure is related in a predictable manner to other independently derived
measures of the same theoretical variable, which is called a construct.172
170. For a useful discussion of measurement validity focusing on the uses of psychological
testing for forensic purposes, see David Medoff, The Scientific Basis of Psychological Testing:
Considerations Following Daubert, Kumho and Joiner, 41 FAM. CT. Rv. 199 (2003). For a
general discussion of measurement theory, see ROBERT J. GREGORY, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING:
HISTORY, PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS (Rebecca Pascal ed., 3d ed. 2000).
171. Measurement reliability is sometimes discussed as a separate concept from measurement
validity. We discuss it here as a type of measurement validity because a measure cannot be valid
if it is not reliable. Measurement reliability is assessed in manners similar to overall measurement
validity.
172. Standard approaches to assessing measurement validity that examine the nature of the
measure's relationship to other independently derived measures include convergent validity and
discriminate validity, each being types of construct validity, and concurrent validity and predictive
validity, each being types of criterion validity. Detailed discussions of these methods are beyond
the scope of this paper. Other approaches to measurement validity that do not rely on multiple,
independent measures include face validity and logical validity, both of which are types of content
validity. For more detailed discussions of measurement validity and reliability, see Medoff, supra
note 170; ALLEN & YEN, supra note 169; EDWARD G. CARMINES & RICHARD A. ZELLER,
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After the results of initial measurement validity tests are peer reviewed
and published, other researchers typically seek to re-validate and refine
the measure by replicating and extending the initial validation work. For
important measures, this process continues in regular cycles, all of
which are documented in published social scientific literature.
When evaluating a measure, social scientists view measurement
validity as a continuum defined by poles of high and low validity. What
determines the placement of a particular measure on the continuum is
the degree to which it has been successfully validated and improved by
multiple researchers over time. At one end of the continuum are mea-
sures that have never been formally validated, even by the researchers
who first proposed them. Such measures have little or no validity and
could not be accepted as scientific under Daubert. At the other end of
the continuum are measures that have been validated and improved in
multiple studies over a sustained period of time. These measures would
have high measurement validity. It is notable that the majority of mea-
sures would be placed somewhere between the two poles of the mea-
surement validity continuum. What is key for judges to understand is
that the level of validity of a measure is a matter of degree determined
by the amount of empirical validation work done on the measure and the
degree to which this work has supported and improved the measure over
time. Further in this section, we will provide illustrations of measures
relevant to family law and discuss their levels of measurement validity.
What does the process of measurement validation imply for judges
who must make judgments as to the scientific validity of the measure-
ment systems upon which direct research claims or science-based prac-
tice claims are made? Judges will need to determine if the measures
used in the research upon which the claims are based have been vali-
dated according to the process described above. This can be done in a
number of ways. Perhaps the most obvious path for the judge to follow
would be to require the individual who has proffered the claim to pro-
vide the court with a brief substantiating the degree to which the mea-
sures used have been validated. In this regard, it is notable that
scientific publications periodically provide overviews of the current sta-
tus of validity of many important measures.
The court might also seek the opinion of an independent, court-
appointed expert to provide an assessment of the measurement system
under scrutiny. At first glance, this sort of judicially sponsored review
may appear an onerous and time consuming task for judges to undertake.
However, there are only a limited number of measurement systems rele-
RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY ASSESSMENT (John L. Sullivan ed., Sage University Paper Series:
Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, No. 07-017, 1979).
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vant to the caseloads of a typical court, and an assessment, once per-
formed, would not need to be repeated for a substantial period of time
should the same measurement system come into question in subsequent
cases.1 73 We next provide brief examples of how the court might imple-
ment the requirement for well-validated measures for both direct
research and science-based practice claims.
i. Direct Research Claims: One of the key issues studied in the
field of family social science in recent decades is the impact of divorce
on children's well-being. One of the significant dimensions of chil-
dren's well-being addressed in much of this research is social adjust-
ment, which might include such factors as fighting, stealing, lying, or
inappropriate school behavior. If the research proffered to the court
assessed the social adjustment of children, it would be important for the
court to inquire as to how the social adjustment of the children in the
research was measured with specific attention focused on the validity of
the measures employed. In the best research on the impact of divorce on
children's well-being, highly validated measures of social adjustment
such as the Rutter Home Adjustment Scale, the Bristol Social Adjust-
ment Guide, the Achenbach Child Behavior Checklist and the Behav-
ioral Problem Index have been utilized.'74 Researchers, such as
sociologist Andrew Cherlin, have used these scales in highly respected
studies of the impact of divorce on children's well-being with justifiable
confidence in their measurement validity.'75 Hence, a judge encounter-
ing such research could be confident that the research possessed mea-
surement validity. On the other hand, if the research proffered to the
court could not substantiate that its method for measuring children's
social adjustment had been well-validated, the court could not accept the
research as scientific.
ii. Science-Based Practice Claims: How might the requirement
for validated measures be applied in the case of a custody evaluation that
has employed a psychological or other assessment or testing system?
Such an evaluation would be an illustration of what we have called a
173. Note also that some scholars have argued that admissibility decisions in some contexts
should be treated as a matter of law. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
174. EDUCATION, HEALTH AND BEHAVIOUR (Michael Rutter et al. eds., 1970); D.H. STOTr,
THE SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT OF CHILDREN: MANUAL TO THE BRISTOL SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT GUIDES
(3d ed. 1969); THOMAS M. ACHENBACH & CRAIG S. EDELBROCK, BEHAVIORAL PROBLEMS AND
COMPETENCIES REPORTED BY PARENTS OF NORMAL AND DISTURBED CHILDREN AGED FOUR
THROUGH SIXTEEN (46 Monographs of the Soc'y for Res. in Child Dev., No. 1, Serial No. 188,
1981); James L. Peterson & Nicholas Zill, Marital Disruption, Parent-Child Relationships, and
Behavior Problems in Children, 48 J. MARRIAGE & FAm. 295 (1986).
175. See, e.g., Andrew J. Cherlin et al., Longitudinal Studies of Effects of Divorce on Children
in Great Britain and the United States, 252 SCIENCE 1386 (1991).
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science-based practice claim because there is an implicit or explicit
claim that the assessment strategy employed in the custody evaluation
has been developed and validated scientifically. Hence, the judge
should inquire as to whether a research literature that addresses the
validity of the measurement strategy exists and, if it does, whether there
is a consensus that the measurement system is valid. If no literature
exists, a claim of scientific validity cannot be supported.
If a validation literature for the measure used in the custody evalua-
tion did exist, then its rigor would need to be assessed and its conclu-
sions summarized as a prerequisite for determining whether its claim to
scientific validity would be accepted. This is precisely what has been
done, for example, in the case of Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory (MMPI-2), a personality measurement tool frequently used in
custody evaluations.' 76 Specifically, there is a large research literature
that has validated the MMPI-2 and courts have accepted the MMPI-2 as
a scientifically valid means of measuring personality.' 77 Other psycho-
logical measures that are well-validated and that might credibly appear
in a custody assessment include the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale,
Third Edition (WAIS-III) and the Personality Assessment Inventory
(PAI). 178
On the other hand, if a review of the existing literature revealed that
a custody evaluation relied upon a measurement strategy that was not
fully validated, that portion of the expert testimony should not be
accepted as scientific. Several well-known psychological tests that com-
monly appear in expert testimony in family and probate courts have not
been scientifically validated. 179 These tests include the Thematic Apper-
ception Test, the Tasks of Emotional Development Test, and several ver-
sions of the Draw-a-Person Test and the Sentence Completion test.'80
The recently developed Ackerman-Schoendorf Scales for Parent
Evaluation of Custody Tests (ASPECT) is an illustration of a measure-
ment strategy that seeks to scientifically assess the relative fitness of
parents for custody.' 8 ' While substantial and promising work has been
done on ASPECT's validation, its scientific validity is still an issue of
176. See, e.g., People v. Stoll, 783 P.2d 698 (Cal. 1989).
177. See FORENSIC APPLICATIONS OF THE MMPI-2 (Yossef S. Ben-Porath et al., eds., 2 Applied
Psychology: Individual, Social and Community Issues, 1995); David Medoff, MMPI-2 Validity
Scales in Child Custody Evaluations: Clinical versus Statistical Significance, 17 BEHAV. Sci. & L.
409 (1999).
178. For relevant citations on the validation of these measures, see Medoff, supra note 170, at
208.
179. Id. at 206, 209.
180. Id.
181. MARC J. ACKERMAN & KATHLEEN SCHOENDORF, ASPECT: ACKERMAN-SCHOENDORF
SCALES FOR PARENT EVALUATION OF CUSTODY (1992).
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some debate."I Hence, until a consensus develops as to the validity of
ASPECT, the prudent course for a judge to take would be to deny testi-
mony based on ASPECT.
b. The Need for Multiple and Independent Measures of Variables
Beyond the need for well-validated, individual measures, judges
should be familiar with two additional propositions of measurement the-
ory when they assess social scientific research claims. First, no single
measure or indicator of a variable (e.g., children's well-being) will be
fully adequate to empirically capture the entirety of the reality the varia-
ble seeks to measure. Second, all individual measures or indicators of
concepts contain some amount of measurement error; hence measure-
ment error or bias cannot be fully eliminated. 83 These propositions and
the research that supports them result in the following principle of mea-
surement theory: overall measurement validity is enhanced substantially
with the use of multiple, independently derived measures of the variable
to be measured.
The existence of multiple independent measures of a variable does
not assure perfect measurement, but rather maximizes the likelihood that
measurement error will be minimized. Further, when multiple measures
of the same variable are employed and the results of a study are consis-
tent across the various measures, overall confidence in the study's
results is enhanced significantly. In the social sciences, these proposi-
tions were first demonstrated persuasively in the now-classic 1959 arti-
cle by Donald Campbell and Donald Fiske entitled "Convergent and
Discriminant Validation by the Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix."' 84 In
the analysis, the authors showed that both measurement validity and the
overall validity of the conclusions from empirical studies are maximized
when researchers employ multiple, well-validated measures of the key
variables. Below, we provide illustrations of how judges might apply
this principle when direct research claims and science-based practice
claims are made.
182. For varying views on the measurement validity of ASPECT, see AcKERMAN & KANE,
supra note 90; Gary B. Melton, Review of the Ackerman-Schoendorf Scales for Parent Evaluation
of Custody, in THE TWELFrH MENTAL MEASUREMENTS YEARBOOK 222 (Jane Close Conoley &
James C. Impara eds., 1995). Melton is particularly critical of the psychometric properties of
ASPECT, that is, its demonstrated measurement reliability and validity.
183. In this discussion our comments are geared mainly to the measurement of complex
variables, such as the well-being of children. While in theory the points we make would also
apply to more straightforward variables such as age and gender, these variables are generally not
subjected to high levels of scrutiny with respect to measurement validity.
184. Donald Campbell & Donald Fiske, Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the
Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix, 56 PSYCHOL. BULL. 81 (1959).
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i. Direct Research Claims: To illustrate the application of this
principle to the case of direct research claims, consider again a child
protection or divorce case in which the court is presented with direct
research claims that involve the measurement of children's well-being.
The court would want to inquire not only about the degree of validity of
individual measures of the children's well-being (see above), but also
about whether the study employed multiple, well-validated measures of
the well-being of children. A measurement strategy that uses multiple
validated measures is more convincing than one that relies on a single
measure, even if that single measure is well-validated. Research has
shown, for example, that reports of children's well-being may vary sig-
nificantly depending on whether the sources of the information are par-
ents, teachers, the child, clinicians or other trained observers.185 It is not
so much that these individuals err in their reports, as it is that each has
important information to contribute to the overall picture of a child's
well-being. Hence, a study that relied solely on a parent's report on a
child's well-being would be considered weaker than a study that also
had gathered information from other sources, including the child herself
and other trained observers.
A significant body of research on the impact of divorce on children
that uses multiple measures has been conducted using the National Lon-
gitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), a large nationally representative
sample of youth between the ages of fourteen and twenty-two that began
in 1979.186 Since 1986, the "youth" (now adult women) in the study and
their children have been followed intensely with a broad array of mea-
sures gathered from a variety of sources designed to monitor the chil-
dren's well-being. This component of the study is called the Youth
Supplement (YS). In the NLSY-YS, extensive and repeated interviews
and assessments are conducted with the mothers of NLSY-YS children
concerning the child's pre- and post-natal health history. Mothers also
provided information for the Behavioral Problem Index (BPI) and for a
variety of other child-related attitudes and behaviors. In addition to
information from mothers, the NLSY-YS collected information from the
children themselves on a range of well-validated cognitive development
scales such as the Peabody Assessments187 and the Wechsler Intelli-
185. Thomas M. Achenbach et al., Child/Adolescent Behavioral and Emotional Problems:
Implications of Cross-Informant Correlations for Situational Specificity, 101 PSYCH. BULL. 213
(1987).
186. FRANK L. MoTr, THE NLSY CHILDREN 1992: DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION (rev. ed.
1998); PAULA C. BAKER ET A., NLSY CHILD HANDBOOK (rev. ed. 1993); OHIO STATE UNIV.
CTR. FOR HUMAN RES. RESEARCH, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
NLSY79: CHILD & YOUNG ADULT DATA USERS GUIDE (2002), available at http://www.bls.gov/
nls/y79cyaguide/nlsy79cusg.htm.
187. LLOYD M. DUNN & FREDERICK C. MARKWARDT, JR., PEABODY INDIVIDUAL
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gence Scales. 188 Further, trained NLSY-YS observers conducted the
Home Observation for Measurement of the Environment (HOME)
assessment, a well-validated measure of the quality of home environ-
ment.'89 Sociologists Donna Morrison and Andrew Cherlin have used
the full range of NLSY-YS measures in one of the most definitive stud-
ies yet published of the effects of divorce on children.1 9 ° One of the
reasons that this study would deserve to be considered scientific by a
court derives precisely from the fact that it integrates multiple sources of
well-validated measures into a comprehensive analysis. 1 '
Much of the same may be said of law professor Michael Wald's
highly regarded field study of proposed innovations in the California
child protection system. In order to assess the impact of these innova-
tions, Wald and his colleagues needed to measure children's well-being.
To do so, they collected information from a variety of sources using
various measurement strategies, including health screening by medical
professionals; administration of the Wechler IQ test to the children;
assessment of academic achievement based on school records and
teacher interviews; reports from mothers and teachers on a variety of
child well-being characteristics using validated measures; Child Protec-
tive Services records; and interviews with the children themselves using
validated measurement systems.1 9a
In summary, carefully designed studies, such as Morrison's, Cher-
lin's, and Wald's, that collect information from multiple sources using
multiple, validated measurement strategies meet the scientific standard
of measurement validity and should be treated as such by the courts.
ii. Science-Based Practice Claim: To illustrate the need for multi-
ple, independently derived measurement strategies in the case of sci-
ence-based practice claims, consider the issue of assessing parental
ACHIEVEMENT TEST MANUAL (1970); FREDERICK C. MARKWARDT, JR., PEABODY INDIVIDUAL
ACHIEVEMENT TEST- REVISED (1989).
188. See supra text accompanying note 178.
189. See Robert H. Bradley, The HOME Inventory: Review and Reflections, in 25 ADVANCES
IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR 241 (Hayne W. Reese ed., 1994); Robert H. Bradley &
Bettye M. Caldwell, Using the HOME Inventory to Assess the Family Environment, 14 PEDIATRIC
NURSING 97 (1988).
190. Donna Ruane Morrison & Andrew J. Cherlin, The Divorce Process and Young Children's
Well-Being: A Prospective Analysis, 57 J. MARRIAGE & FAm. 800 (1995).
191. An additional strength of the NLSY-Children data study is that it is longitudinal, in other
words, it follows children over time and, as a result, it is able to measure developmental processes
inherent in childhood and adolescence. For another divorce impact study that uses multiple
sources of information on children's well-being, see P. Lindsay Chase-Lansdale et al., The Long-
Term Effects of Parental Divorce on the Mental Health of Young Adults: A Developmental
Perspective, 66 CHILD DEV. 1614 (1995).
192. MICHAEL S. WALD ET AL., PROTECTING ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN (1988).
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capacity in the context of child protection proceedings deciding ques-
tions such as removal, visitation, reunification and termination of paren-
tal rights. In this area, the best-practices models for forensic custody
assessments coincide with the scientific standard encouraging the use of
multiple, independently derived measurement strategies. Medoff has
noted that in the areas of child protection and child custody forensic
assessments, a model of professional practices has emerged which calls
for the assessor to gather information from multiple sources using multi-
ple assessment methods and to integrate the results of these assessments
into a final report.193 For example, such reports would optimally be
based on multiple sessions in which the evaluating mental health profes-
sional would interview parents across a broad range of topics, parent-
child observations, administration of relevant tests/inventories for the
parent, administration of relevant tests/inventories for the child, review
of child protective services' previous reports, and interviewing of collat-
eral sources such as teachers, social workers, family friends, extended
kin, and physicians.'94 This approach is entirely consistent with the
multi-source/multi-method measurement standard we have discussed, as
well as the professional standards of practice developed by organizations
such as the American Psychological Association.'
95
Unfortunately, this model of professional practice is often at vari-
ance with the actual practice of parental capacity assessments in child
protection matters, which typically rely on a single session with the par-
ent(s), no in-home visit, few sources of information other than those
provided by the parent(s), no reference to previous written reports, and
little use of well-validated assessments methods.1 96 When judges are
faced with such incomplete parental capacity assessments, they should
know that the assessments not only fall short of meeting professional
standards, but also do not meet the standards of scientific measurement.
The key point to be taken from this section is that judges should
inquire not only as to the validity of individual social science research
measures, but also as to whether the research proffered to the court has
employed multiple, independent measures of key variables. When evi-
dence exists that a multi-method measurement approach has been
193. Medoff, supra note 170, at 210.
194. See Karen S. Budd, Assessing Parenting Capacity in Child Protection Cases: A Clinical
Practice Model, 4 CLINICAL CHILD & FAM. PSYCH. REV. 1 (2001).
195. GUIDELINES FOR PROFESSIONAL EVALUATIONS IN CHILD PROTECTION MA'IrERS (Am.
Psychological Ass'n Comm. on Practices & Standards 1998), available at http://www.apa.org/
practice/childprotection.html.
196. Karen S. Budd et al., Clinical Assessment of Parents in Child Protection Cases: An
Empirical Analysis, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 93 (2001).
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employed and that results are consistent across measures, such results
should be afforded greater weight by the court.
2. INTERNAL VALIDITY AND THE PROBLEM OF CAUSAL INFERENCE
Based on the prior discussion, let us assume that a researcher has a
set of highly valid measures for the key variables needed to test the
hypothesis that X causes Y, symbolically X --- Y. The next fundamental
methodological issue is to design a study that will allow the researcher
to determine with a relatively high degree of certainty whether X has
caused Y, for example, whether joint physical custody arrangements
cause children to be better off than sole physical custody arrange-
ments. 197 Determining whether causal relationships exist among vari-
ables in human social systems in general and in family systems in
particular is very difficult for at least two important reasons.
First, to reiterate a point made in the prior section, the social world
is a very complex place. Typically, events such as marriage, birth, foster
care placement, and divorce come about not for a single reason, but for
many reasons acting either independently or in combinations called
interaction effects. Hence, social scientists acknowledge that the world
they study is a world of many causes, a multivariate world, where it is
difficult to parcel out the effects of individual causes acting indepen-
dently or in combination with other factors.
A second problem faced by social scientists seeking to make causal
inferences has to do with the distinction between correlation and causa-
tion.' 98 Just because two variables co-vary with each other, in other
words they are correlated or associated, does not mean that a causal
relationship exists between them. A correlation between two variables
may be the result of an underlying causal relationship, but it also may be
spurious. A spurious relationship is an artifact produced by the relation-
ships of the two variables under consideration to some third variable
whose effect has not been taken into account.19 9 Returning to our joint
custody example, assume that a study shows a positive relationship
between joint physical custody and various measures of post-divorce
197. For a recent review of research on this question, see Kelly & Ward, supra note 160, at
350-70.
198. For a discussion of the issue of causation versus association in the context of the Daubert
decision, see Conley & Peterson, supra note 67, at 1218, 1220.
199. For a humorous example of not taking a variable into account, see Eric J. Weissberger,
Biology of the Family Chiaceae (Chia Pets), 4 THE ANNALS OF IMPROBABLE RESEARCH (1998)
(noting that "the Chia's mating call is usually heard in early November . [aifter being born,
juvenile Chias begin life in a purely animal phase, inside a plain cardboard cocoon .. [in an
amazing display of synchrony, all Chias hatch on the morning of December 25, and migrate to
windowsills, where the plant phase begins to grow"), available at http://www.improb.com/air
chives/paperair/volume4/v4i4/chias.htm.
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children's well-being, that is, in joint physical custody cases scores on
measures of children's well-being are significantly higher than in cases
of sole maternal or sole paternal physical custody. Such an effect may
be the result of the hypothesized benefits of joint physical custody, but it
also may be because parents who select joint physical custody have
higher incomes or more amicable divorces than parents who settle upon
sole physical custody arrangements. Unless a research design can con-
trol for or neutralize the effects of income and the level of conflict in the
divorce process, there will be uncertainty about, the causal nature of the
relationship between joint physical custody and children's well-being.
To rigorously determine whether a hypothesized causal relationship
exists, a research design must be good at (a) controlling for possible
spurious relationships and (b) determining the size and direction of inde-
pendent and combined effects of individual variables in a multivariate
world. Research designs that possess these characteristics are said to
have high internal validity, that is, they yield robust answers to questions
about hypothesized causal relationships.2 °° Figure 1 graphically repre-
sents the issue that is central to internal validity, namely that we can
only know the nature of the true relationship between X, and Y if we
have controlled for the possible confounding effects of the other vari-
ables (X2, 3, 4) in the model.20 ' When a judge encounters social science
research on families that makes causal assertions, the judge should
assess the internal validity of the research design upon which such
claims are based. In the following subparts a and b, we briefly discuss
common research designs that a judge may encounter and their strengths
and weaknesses in relation to internal validity.
a. The Randomized Experiment
In the best of all worlds, researchers wishing to determine whether
a causal relationship exists between two variables will use a randomized
experimental design. For purposes of illustration, assume that a judge is
hearing a child protection case and an expert witness is making the
direct research claim that family preservation programs (FPP) have been
shown to be effective in treating families where the risk is high that
200. The classic articulation of internal validity in the context of social science research is
DONALD T. CAMPBELL & JULIAN C. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASi-ExPERIMENTAL
DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH (1963). For a valuable discussion of experimental research designs for
public policy analysis, see John Gilbert et al., Assessing Social Innovations: An Empirical Base
for Policy, in STATISTICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 185 (William B. Fairley & Frederick Mosteller eds.,
1977). For an excellent discussion on internal validity in the context of evaluating innovations in
legal settings, see EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW: REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 1981).
201. The colloquial expression, all things being equal (ceteris paribus), captures well the
underlying meaning of the concept of internal validity.
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FIGURE 1: INTERNAL VALIDITY MODEL: TESTING FOR THE X 1 --- Y
HYPOTHESIS WHILE CONTROLLING FOR RIVAL
HYPOTHESES (X 2 , 3 , 4....)
X, Independent
Variable of Interest
Y Dependent
Variable of
Interest
X2,3a, .... Other Possible
Causes & Confounding
Variables to be Controlled
children will be removed and placed in foster care because of concerns
for the children's safety. The goals of FPP programs are to avoid
removal by safely maintaining children in the homes of their parents and
to improve the well-being of the children by providing an array of short-
term, intensive services.202 A judge faced with such a claim would want
to ascertain whether scientific research supported this claim. Generally,
if the available research upon which the expert witness based the claim
that FPP programs are effective had employed randomized experimental
research designs (and it met other validity standards discussed in this
section), the judge could be relatively secure in his or her assessment of
the internal validity of this direct research claim.
To understand why this is the case, it is important to comprehend
the logic of experimental design as it would apply in the case of FPP
programs. In principle, researchers studying the effectiveness of FPP
programs would want to test hypotheses such as:
202. For a description of these programs and a literature review of research in the U.S. on their
impacts, see Robert F. Kelly, Family Preservation and Reunification Programs in Child
Protection Cases: Effectiveness, Best Practices, and Implications for Legal Representation,
Judicial Practice, and Public Policy, 34 FAM. L.Q. 359 (2000).
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• Children who participate in family preservation programs will be
more likely to safely remain in residence with their parents or
guardians than non-participating children receiving status quo
child protection services who remain in residence with their par-
ents or guardians.
• Children who participate in family preservation programs will
demonstrate higher scores on measures of well-being than non-
participating children receiving status quo services.
A randomized experimental design would call for the researchers to cre-
ate two groups for the purpose of comparison: an experimental group of
families that participates in the program and a control group that
receives only status quo services.2 °3 The two groups would then be fol-
lowed over time and information would be collected on program out-
come measures such as removals from home, health, school
performance, and family functioning.
These program outcome measures are the dependent variables (Y)
in the hypotheses. By creating the two groups, the researcher's design
allows for comparisons to be made between the treatment group and the
control group to measure the impact of the independent variable (FPP
program participation vs. status quo (X1)) on these dependent variables.
However, for a true experimental design to exist, it is not sufficient
to simply create an experimental group and a control group. The experi-
mental and control groups must be created by a random function such as
tossing a fair coin. This process is referred to either as randomization or
random assignment and it is a necessary condition in creating a classic
experimental design.
The importance of random assignment for creating the experimen-
tal and control groups derives from the following logic. Assume that we
do not know if the experimental and control groups were created
through random assignment. Further, assume that the researchers have
collected outcome information from the experimental and control groups
over the course of two years and that analysis reveals that the experi-
mental group has done much better than the control group. For example,
analysis might reveal that many more children in the experimental group
have remained safely at home than in the control group. The researchers
naturally would be tempted to conclude that the family preservation pro-
gram had been effective. Given these results, a methodological skeptic
immediately would wish to know if any factor or variable besides the
experimental treatment could account for the results. The skeptic's
question is the internal validity question, namely how well has the
203. There are experimental designs that use more than two groups. We rely on the simple,
two-group design for purposes of illustration.
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research design controlled for rival plausible hypotheses (X2, 3,4 in the
internal validity model) or, alternatively, are the two groups equal in all
respects other than the experimental treatment?
Scientists have concluded that the best way to make experimental
and control groups equivalent on all characteristics other than receiving
or not receiving the experimental treatment is to use random assignment,
that is, to allow chance and chance alone to allocate subjects to experi-
mental or control groups. 2° Hence, if our hypothetical researchers used
randomization to create the two groups, they can respond to the skeptic
that yes, within a statistically known level of certainty, the treatment was
the source of improvements in the experimental group.
To gain an appreciation of the advantages of randomized experi-
mental designs, it is helpful to reflect on a hypothetical design that does
not employ randomization to create experimental and control groups and
the limitations that result with respect to internal validity and causal
inference. Again, consider a researcher seeking to evaluate a family
preservation program. Such a researcher might be tempted for a variety
of reasons, including expense and effort, to create an experimental group
by calling for volunteers. The researcher would subsequently administer
the new program to the volunteers and then compare the volunteer group
with a status quo group of families who had not volunteered for the
program.
The problem with such a design from the perspective of internal
validity is that volunteers for such a program may differ systematically
from non-volunteers on characteristics that are related to outcome mea-
sures (X2, 3, 4... in the internal validity model). For example, if volunteers
have fewer problems to begin with or if they have a more cooperative
attitude toward service providers and programs, one would expect them
to do better on outcome measures independent of FPP program partici-
pation. As a result, we would be uncertain if the program caused
improvements or if the volunteer-related factors caused the improve-
ments. Consequently, we would be on weak ground in drawing any
causal inferences related to program-effect hypotheses. Note, however,
that if the researcher had used a randomized experimental design, there
would be a high level of certainty that prior to the initiation of the exper-
iment, the average number of problems faced by families and the aver-
age level of cooperativeness in the experimental and control groups
would be about the same and, as such, not a concern from the perspec-
tive of internal validity.2 0 5
Judges may conclude from this discussion that a study presented to
204. CAMPBELL & STANLEY, supra note 200.
205. Kelly, supra note 202, limited his review of FPP program evaluations to mainly
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the court that has employed a randomized experimental design offers the
highest level of internal validity, which is the ability of a design to deter-
mine if a causal relationship exists. Such research, if otherwise compe-
tently executed, should be given greater scientific credence by the courts
than research that does not use a randomized experimental design.
b. Alternatives to the Randomized Experiment:
Quasi-Experimentation
One of the problems with carrying out randomized experimental
research designs is that for ethical, political, and practical reasons they
cannot always be employed with human populations. For example, ran-
domly assigning some children to joint physical custody, others to pater-
nal custody, and others to maternal custody for a study of the impacts of
custody arrangements on children would meet the requirements for a
rigorous experimental design, but ethical and legal objections quite
rightly would prevent such a design from ever being carried out. Given
these limits, social scientists and policy researchers often employ alter-
natives to pure experimental designs that do not involve random assign-
ment, but still retain many of the internal validity advantages of
randomized designs. Such alternatives generally are referred to as
quasi-experimental designs.
One such alternative, called a matched-group design, involves first
identifying research subjects who agree to be exposed to an innovation
or who have been exposed to the innovation naturally and using them as
a treatment group. Next, this quasi-treatment group is matched with a
quasi-control group consisting of subjects who have not been exposed to
the innovation and who are matched to the quasi-treatment group. In
principle, subjects in the treatment and control groups should be
matched on all important characteristics that are thought to influence the
relationship between the innovation under investigation and outcome
measures. Hence, in matching, comparison groups are produced based
on the researcher's knowledge of the population and the processes being
investigated, rather than the more scientifically rigorous procedure of
random assignment. Matching creates a valuable comparison group
with which to assess a scientific hypothesis, legal reform, or innovative
program so long as great care is taken in matching the experimental and
control groups. Thus, while the internal validity of a matched group
design would not be as strong as that of a randomized experimental
design, it could be nearly as strong and it will clearly be superior to a
design that did not employ a control group. Matched-group designs
experimental studies and found that some FPP programs with specific characteristics had
moderate to small positive impacts, but that many programs had no effect.
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have been used effectively to study legal innovations such as child sup-
port reform.2 °6
Judges assessing matched-group studies may conclude that if a
matched-group design has been well-executed, that is, matching has in
fact occurred on all or most of the background characteristics known to
be important, then credence should be given to the study's results, but
not the same high level of credence as would be afforded results from a
randomized experiment.
In addition to experimental and matched-group designs, a third
research design often used in family social science for studying causal
relationships should be considered, namely the survey. Surveys typi-
cally involve two major steps: the sampling of a population of interest,
ideally using a probability sample (see the following section), and the
administration of some type of questionnaire or interview to collect
information from the members of the sample.
In family research, social scientists increasingly conduct longitudi-
nal surveys in which the same respondents are repeatedly queried over
time. Examples of well-designed longitudinal surveys of the population
of United States families, children and youth include the National Sur-
vey of Children, the National Survey of Families and Households, and
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). °7 Fortunately, it is
feasible to use survey data, especially if they are longitudinal, to study
causal hypotheses relevant to family law issues.
Recall that the key to making any causal inference is the develop-
ment of a control group that is equivalent to the group that experiences
the treatment or event that is being assessed. Assume that once again we
wish to assess the potential impact of joint legal custody arrangements
relative to sole legal custody arrangements, this time on the quality of
post-divorce co-parenting. With a longitudinal survey of divorce cases,
we can construct a control group of divorced families that has not exper-
206. Irwin Garfinkel et al., The Wisconsin Child Support Assurance System: Estimated Effects
on Poverty, Labor Supply, Caseloads, and Costs, 25 J. HUM. RESOURCES 1 (1990); Irwin
Garfinkel & Marieka M. Klawitter, The Effect of Routine Income Withholding of Child Support
Collections, 9 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 155 (1990); Irwin Garfinkel, Utilization and Effects
of Immediate Income Withholding and the Percentage-of-Income Standard: An Interim Report on
the Child Support Assurance Demonstration, 4 INST. FOR RES. ON POVERTY, SPECIAL REP. No. 42
(1986).
207. For general descriptions of these data sets, see respectively NICHOLAS ZILL ET AL., 1976-
1987 NATIONAL SURVEY OF CHILDREN: WAVES 1, 2, AND 3 (CHILD TRENDS, INC.) (1992); JAMES
SWEET ET AL., UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON, THE DESIGN AND CONTENT OF THE
NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILIEs AND HOUSEHOLDS (NSFH Working Paper No.1, 1988), available
at http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/nsfh/home.htm; NLSY79: CHILD & YOUNG ADULT DATA USERS
GUIDE, supra note 186. For the Canadian equivalent of the NLSY, see Statistics Canada's
National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth (2003), available at http://www.statcan.ca/
english/sadds/4450.htm.
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ienced joint legal custody and a treatment group that has experienced
joint legal custody. But how comparable are these groups? How much
internal validity would conclusions concerning the impact of joint legal
custody on children possess if they are based on comparisons between
these groups?
To answer these questions, it is important to recognize that statisti-
cal techniques can be employed with survey data to control for, that is,
make equivalent, background differences between groups we wish to
compare; differences that might confound our ability to make the sorts
of comparisons needed for strong causal inferences.2z 8 This is precisely
the approach taken by psychologist Eleanor Maccoby and law professor
Robert Mnookin in the Stanford Child Custody Study, a highly regarded
analysis of post-divorce custody arrangements and their impacts in two
highly diverse California counties.2 "9
Maccoby and Mnookin used a longitudinal survey design in which
court caseloads of divorces were sampled soon after initial filings and
the divorcing parents were interviewed on three occasions during the
three-year period following the divorce. Among the issues that Mac-
coby and Mnookin explored in these analyses was the effect of joint
legal custody arrangements on post-divorce parenting, visitation, and
child support. In making comparisons between joint legal custody and
other custodial arrangements, the authors developed statistical models
that controlled for potentially confounding background factors such as
pre-divorce parental income, education and conflict (X2 3, 4... in Figure 1).
For example, in controlling for pre-divorce family income, the authors
were able to account for the possibility that higher income families may
be both more likely to choose joint legal custody and more likely to
experience or report better post-divorce adjustment. In fact, Maccoby
and Mnookin found that joint legal custody had little effect on post-
divorce parenting, visitation, and child support. These findings are cred-
ible in terms of internal validity because of the well-developed statistical
208. For a general discussion geared to legal audiences of the statistical regression techniques
used to control for confounding factors, see Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reference Guide on Multiple
Regression, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON ScIEmTcC EVIDENCE 179 (2d ed. Fed. Judicial Ctr. 2000).
For a general discussion of survey research geared to legal audiences, see Shari Seidman
Diamond, Reference Guide on Survey Research, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
229 (2d ed. Fed. Judicial Ctr. 2000). For discussions of the value of longitudinal data in assessing
causal relationships, see JAMES S. COLEMAN, LONGITUDINAL DATA ANALYSIS (1981); Jay D.
Teachman, Methodological Issues in the Analysis of Family Formation and Dissolution, 44 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 1037 (1982); and PAUL D. ALLISON, EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS: REGRESSION
FOR LONGITUDINAL EVENT DATA (1984).
209. ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND
LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY (1992); Robert H. Mnookin et al., Private Ordering Revisited:
What Custodial Arrangements Are Parents Negotiating?, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE
CROSSROADS 37 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Henna Hill Kay eds., 1990).
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models used to control for differences between divorced families with
joint legal custody and those with other custody arrangements.
From the perspective of judges evaluating such evidence, it is
important to recognize that statistical controls of the type used by Mac-
coby and Mnookin would not be considered as robust as the controls
produced by well-designed randomized or quasi-experimental matched-
group designs, but comparisons derived from powerful statistical models
do provide reasonably strong grounds upon which to draw causal
inferences. 1 °
Several general implications may be drawn from this discussion of
internal validity. It is essential that judges critically examine the
grounds upon which researchers and practitioners make causal asser-
tions. In doing so, judges will need to inquire as to the measures taken
to control for rival causal hypotheses as plausible explanations for study
results. Such an inquiry will inevitably lead judges to ask questions
about control groups and other design methods used to control factors
that may confound the researchers' abilities to make strong causal infer-
ences. A crucial implication of this analysis is that judges should be
particularly skeptical of small one-group designs with no control group
that do not address systematically the problem of plausible alternative
explanations of study findings.21'
As an illustration of the difficulties associated with one-group
designs, consider the fact that small, mainly one-group clinical studies
were used to identify the parent alienation syndrome (PAS). 21 2 Because
most of these studies did not employ control groups or other rigorous
control mechanisms, their ability to identify the causes and effects of the
syndrome has been extremely limited. The same may be said with
respect to evaluating the impact of treatment modalities geared to
PAS.213 Like PAS research, early research on family preservation pro-
210. The use of survey research in the social sciences to do causal analysis is very similar to
the epidemiological techniques Used in biomedical science. See, e.g., Michael D. Green et al.,
Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIIC EvIDENCE 333 (2d ed.
Fed. Judicial Ctr. 2000).
211. Hypothetical illustrations of one-group designs might include: a child psychologist who
employs a new therapy for treating teen depression in four of his/her adolescent clients with
similar symptoms and who finds that there is improvement in each of the teens; or a single school
district that alters its approach to providing support services to children experiencing divorce and
finds that the students' test scores improve. The problem with one-group designs is that they do
not allow for comparisons with subjects who were not exposed to the treatment or intervention
under consideration. Hence, there is no way to tell whether the improvements found are the result
of the treatment or factors unrelated to the treatment. Among research designs, the one-group
design is the weakest in terms of internal validity. See CAMPBELL & STANLEY, supra note 200.
212. RICHARD A. GARDNER, THE PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME: A GUIDE FOR MENTAL
HEALTH AND LEGAL PROFESSIONALS (1992).
213. See Kathleen Coulborn Faller, The Parental Alienation Syndrome: What Is It and What
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grams was largely based on small, one-group studies, which generally
reported very optimistic results. Later research employing more con-
trolled designs reported more mixed and nuanced results.2z 4
Hence, to reiterate, all social science research designs are not equal
in their ability to control for alternative explanations and rival hypothe-
ses. The proper use of social science findings requires disciplined
inquiry concerning questions of internal validity and causal inference.
3. EXTERNAL VALIDITY
Assume for the purposes of our analysis that a family social science
study is presented to a court and that its measurement validity and inter-
nal validity are robust. The court should be concerned with a third type
of design validity, external validity. External validity refers to the
degree to which a study's results may be generalized properly to rele-
vant populations and conditions beyond the actual subjects of the
study.215
In the social sciences the issues of external validity and general-
izability frequently lead to concerns about sampling. Because of cost
and other considerations, social scientists typically study sample mem-
bers of populations rather than studying entire populations. Hence,
unless a researcher is studying an entire population through census
methods, a major challenge in family research is developing representa-
tive samples from which to generalize to the population of interest. This
is a challenge in all sample-based research whether the sample is a sur-
vey, a matched-group study, an ethnography, an experimental design, or
any other type of data collection design.
a. Sampling and Generalizing
The optimal method for achieving a representative sample is to use
a random function to select members for the sample from a universal
listing of all members of the population that the sample is expected to
represent. A sample selected in this manner is called a simple random
sample. There are many technical variations of simple random samples
(generally referred to as probability samples), but the key notion for the
assessor of family social scientific research to keep in mind is that non-
probability samples are likely biased, and if they are biased, they will
present a distorted picture of the population. In contrast, well-designed
Data Support It?, 3 CHILD MALTREATMENT 100 (1998); Joan B. Kelly & Janet R. Johnston, The
Alienated Child: A Reformulation of Parental Alienation Syndrome, 39 FAM. CT. REv. 249
(2001); see also sources cited infra note 164.
214. See Kelly, supra note 202.
215. See Medoff, supra note 170, at 201; CAMPBELL & STANLEY, supra note 200, at 5.
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and well-implemented probability samples provide the best means avail-
able for minimizing the risk of bias, and for this reason they possess
high levels of external validity or generalizability. Further, statistical
measures of significance and levels of confidence may be properly
employed only when a study utilizes a probability sample.21 6
Hence, the first question that a judge should ask in attempting to
assess the external validity of any sample-based family study is: was a
random process used to select the sample? If it was not, then the judge
should have serious concerns about the study's representativeness and
any use of statistical analysis in the study would be substantially limited.
For a variety of reasons, many of which are related to time and
cost, some researchers rely on small, non-random samples in their work.
For example, in their much cited work on the impact of divorce on chil-
dren, Judith Wallerstein and Joan Kelly used a sample of families with
children experiencing divorce who presented themselves to a family
center for divorce-related counseling and who subsequently agreed to
participate in the study.21 7 This type of sample is often referred to as a
convenience sample because it capitalizes on social situations where
groups of interest to researchers are concentrated. In the case of the
Wallerstein and Kelly study, this was a clinical setting. Unfortunately
for research purposes, however, the subset of divorcing or divorced fam-
ilies who would present themselves to a clinic for assistance is likely to
be a group with characteristics atypical of the general population of
divorcing couples with dependent children. While we cannot be certain
that the study is unrepresentative, the odds are great that it contains sub-
stantial systematic sampling bias that will seriously compromise its
external validity. The use of convenience samples may sometimes be
justified when research on a given topic is in its early and exploratory
stages and research funding is limited. While the results of such studies
may be of interest to the scientific community because of their novelty
and therefore merit publication, the applicability and utility of such
research findings are extremely limited in a legal setting.2" 8
Even when a study intends to use a random sample, substantial dif-
216. For a general introduction to sampling theory in the context of social science surveys, see
GRAHAM KALTON, INTRODUCTION TO SURVEY SAMPLING (John L. Sullivan & Richard G. Niemi
eds., Sage University Paper Series: Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, No. 07-035,
1983).
217. JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN BERLIN KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How
CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE (1980).
218. In addition to the sampling problems discussed above, the Wallerstein and Kelly study
has been criticized because it did not include a control group of children who had not experienced
divorce. Without such a control group, the authors' well-publicized conclusions concerning the
negative impact of divorce on children are subject to criticisms related to internal validity. See
discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
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ficulties may arise in implementing the design. One such difficulty
relates to response rates.2 t 9 Once subjects are randomly selected for the
sample, it is crucial that the researcher maximize the response rate of
these individuals, households, or families, if the benefits of a random
sample are to be realized. For example, in a divorce study researchers
might identify all families that had divorced in a given year by using
county-level court records. From such a listing, the researchers then
would randomly select the cases for their sample. Once this sample
selection occurs, the researchers are faced with the task of securing the
participation of the selected families. The response rate is the number of
families who participate divided by the number randomly selected for
the sample.22 ° Securing a high response rate typically involves time-
consuming tracking and follow-up efforts and, in some instances,
inducements for prospective participants. 2 ' Low participation rates are
problematic because non-participants may differ from participants in
systematic ways that make the sample unrepresentative or biased and
thereby jeopardize the generalizability of the study. Such unrepresenta-
tiveness is often referred to as a selection bias.222 For example, if par-
ents experiencing high-conflict divorces were significantly less likely to
participate in the study described above, the resulting sample would not
accurately represent relevant divorce processes, such as the use of joint
physical or legal custody arrangements.223
How should judges assess response rates in sample-based family
studies? First, it is crucial that judges inquire as to the exact response
rate of any study brought before the court. A judge should be seriously
concerned about a study that does not present information on its
response rate. If this information cannot be ascertained, the study
should be devalued. Second, a response rate in the range of seventy
percent or better is generally considered to be quite good because it is
unlikely, although not impossible, that selection biases will be large
enough to seriously bias the results of the study. 224 Third, regardless of
219. See generally SURVEY NONRESPONSE (Robert M. Grove et al., eds., 2002).
220. See THE AM. Ass'N FOR PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH, STANDARD DEFINITIONS: FINAL
DISPOSITIONS OF CASE CODES AND OUTCOME RATES FOR SURVEYS (3d ed. 2004).
221. Examples of studies of divorce that have used this approach include: MACCOBY &
MNOOKIN, supra note 209; Maria Cancian & Daniel R. Myer, Who Gets Custody?, 35
DEMOGRAPHY 147 (1998).
222. For a general introduction to these problems, see Richard A. Berk, An Introduction to
Sample Selection Bias in Sociological Data, 48 Am. Soc. REv. 386 (1983); KALTON, supra note
216.
223. For comparisons of response rates in recent divorce studies, see I-Fen Lin, Perceived
Fairness and Compliance with Child Support Obligations, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAi. 388 (2000).
224. DAVID B. LARSON ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., THE SYSTEMATIC
REVIEW: AN INNOVATIVE APPROACH TO REVIEWING RESEARCH (1992), available at http://aspe.os.
dhhs.gov/daltcp/reports/sysrevia.htm. See also SURVEY NONRESFONSE, supra note 219.
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whether the response rate is above or below seventy percent, judges
should look for a discussion of possible bias related to the study's
response rate. Generally, it is possible to compare the major characteris-
tics of a sample with information from other sources about the popula-
tion with which the study is concerned. For example, in the Stanford
Child Custody Study, Mnookin and Maccoby compared their sample of
divorce cases in California with information for the whole of the United
States drawn from the U.S. Census Bureau's Current Population Survey.
Such comparisons give the reader of a research report a reasonable sense
of whether selection bias actually exists and, if so, its degree. 25
If it appears that sample selection bias is a serious concern, there
are various methods available that may be used to partially or fully rem-
edy such problems, including (a) weighting the cases in the sample so
that they better reflect the population to which the sample will be gener-
alized and (b) creating measures called instrumental variables that
explicitly gauge selection bias and control for it. Discussing these meth-
ods is beyond the scope of the present article, but it is important for
judges to be aware that these methods exist and to seek expert assistance
when questions of sample bias arise.22 6
Increasingly, family social science employs longitudinal survey
designs in which a sample is selected at a certain point in time and then
the individuals in the sample are followed over time. We briefly
described how such designs may be used for causal analyses in Part
IV.B.2.b. In such studies the problem of sample attrition, which is akin
to response rate problems, may arise. Sample attrition occurs when
members of a study at its beginning leave the study while it is still in
progress for any number of reasons, such as death, moving, or unwill-
ingness to continue participation. Sample attrition may result in sample
bias if the people who leave the study differ from those who continue to
participate in systematic manners that are associated with the social
processes under investigation. In essence, sample attrition produces the
same issues as a problematic initial response rate because it creates con-
cerns about representativeness. Fortunately, as with response rate
problems discussed above, methods have been developed that may be
used to mitigate bias associated with sample attrition.
The important point to be taken from the preceding discussion is
that when judges encounter research that employs a longitudinal data
collection design, they should inquire as to the degree of attrition that
has occurred during the course of the study and, if it is substantial, they
225. MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 209.
226. See Berk, supra note 222; KALTON, supra note 216.
[Vol. 59:1
2004] SOCIAL SCIENCE KNOWLEDGE IN FAMILY LAW CASES 65
should ascertain what efforts (if any) were undertaken to adjust for the
effects of attrition.
b. The "Fit" Between Research and Legal Application
Beyond technical issues of sampling, there is a second type of
external validity problem with which judges should be concerned when
assessing direct research claims or science-based practice claims in
court, namely the extent to which the research is related to the legal
question the court is addressing. From an evidentiary point of view, this
issue concerns whether there is a "fit," or a valid scientific connection
between the research and the question.227
In family law, this kind of external validity question is often raised
because social science research related to a legal question may not be at
a very sophisticated level at the time the legal issue needs to be
addressed. Often, this may be so because the legal issue precedes the
research. For example, when courts were first confronted with joint cus-
tody questions, there was little research on post-divorce, joint-custody
arrangements compared to other forms of custody arrangements,
because joint custody was relatively new. Further, at this early stage the
joint custody couples studied were those who had insisted on joint cus-
tody, even though it was not the norm at the time. Also, the divorced
parents in these studies typically volunteered to participate rather than
being randomly selected into the studies. Consequently, these early
studies could not be used to generalize to more recent populations of
divorcing parents for whom joint custody is an established option. z 8 In
contrast, consider the current state of research on the impact of divorce
on children. Divorce has been occurring among large numbers of fami-
lies with children since the late 1960s and studies of the impact of
divorce have become increasingly sophisticated since that time. Now
when policies about divorce are debated, there are numerous high qual-
ity studies to consider.2 29
Recent debate about same-sex couple adoption provides another
illustration of problems related to the generalizability of social science
research and its fit in the context of legal decision-making.23 ° Because
227. See infra Part III.A.1.
228. For recent reviews of the social science literature on joint custody, see Kelly & Ward,
supra note 160; Robert Bauserman, Child Adjustment in Joint-Custody Versus Sole-Custody
Arrangements: A Meta-Analytic Review, 16 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 91 (2002).
229. See, e.g., P. Lindsay Chase-Lansdale & E. Mavis Hetherington, The Impact of Divorce on
Life-Span Development: Short and Long-Term Effects, 10 LWE-SPANa BEHAV. & DEV. 105-50
(1990); Paul R. Amato, Children's Adjustment to Divorce: Theories, Hypotheses and Empirical
Support, 55 J. MARIAGE & FAM. 23 (1993); Morrison & Cherlin, supra note 190.
230. See, e.g., Michael S. Wald, Same-Sex Couple Marriage: A Family Policy Perspective, 9
VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 291 (2001); Charlotte J. Patterson, Adoption of Minor Children by
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adoption by same-sex couples is a relatively new occurrence, there is not
a large pool of gay families who have adopted children and there are
relatively few studies of adoptive gay parents. When directly related
research is lacking, courts may be presented with related research. For
example, there is research on gay parents, particularly custodial lesbian
mothers raising their biological children.23' Judges would need to con-
sider whether results from studies of lesbian biological mothers are rele-
vant to a population of both male and female same-sex couples who seek
to adopt children to whom they are not biologically related.232 Simi-
larly, judges might need to consider whether research on heterosexual
couples and adoption may be used to make inferences about gay adop-
tion. Research that is clearly not relevant may also be presented to the
court.2 3 3
In the context of foster care adoptions, however, a court might
determine that the relevant comparison should be the likely impact of
adoption compared to foster care, rather than of gay adoptive parents
compared to hetero-adoptive parents. There seems to be substantial
agreement that adoption is better than staying in foster care, and this
research might be persuasive to a judge who is concerned about the rela-
tive lack of research on gay adoptive parents.2 34 The choice of a com-
parison group in this context is a normative decision, which could be
justified by taking into account governmental policies encouraging
adoption.2 35
Even if there are a number of excellent and relevant studies, social
science research, in itself, does not provide a definitive answer to legal
questions. For example, assume that high quality, national social sci-
ence studies demonstrated that, on average, married parents spent twenty
percent of household income on supporting one child. Further assume
that the legislature amended the child support laws to require that upon
Lesbian and Gay Adults: A Social Science Perspective, 2 Du", J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 191
(1995); Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U.
ILL. L. REv. 833 (1997); Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with Wardle: Morality,
Social Science, and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253 (1998).
231. See, e.g., Charlotte J. Patterson et al., Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents: Research,
Law, and Policy, in CHILDREN, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND THE LAW 176 (Bette L. Bottoms et al. eds.,
2002).
232. Id.
233. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae The Rutherford Institute, Cox v. Fla. Dep't of Health &
Rehab. Serv., 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1995) (No. 82-967).
234. See, e.g., Marianne Berry & Richard P. Barth, A Study of Disrupted Adoptive Placements
of Adolescents, 69 CHILD WELFARE 209 (1990) ("adoption is generally preferred to foster care as a
lasting and developmentally superior choice of home for all children and youths").
235. See, e.g., Karen Spar, Adoption Promotion Legislation in the 105th Congress, CONGRES-
SIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE No. 97-491 (The Library of Congress 1997) (discussing the Adoption
and SAFE Families Act of 1997).
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divorce, non-custodial parents of one child had to pay twenty percent of
their income for child support. A judge who ordered a twenty percent
payment of child support in a divorce case could feel confident that the
order, applied to the individual in the case, was the correct order because
it followed the law. In contrast, what if the judge was trying to "apply"
the finding of the social science study? The judge should not assume
that the divorcing couple before him had allocated their resources during
their marriage in the same way as the average parent in the national
studies. Further, the studies may have addressed only the behavior of
married parents, not of divorced parents. A judge who applied a twenty
percent rule based on his or her knowledge of the study would be going
beyond the study and making a normative decision that consideration of
the behavior of a sample population of married parents was a fair way to
allocate child support for the specific divorcing parents before the judge.
In summary, judges need to be concerned with whether research
can be generalized beyond the subjects of the actual study to the popula-
tion of people who will be affected by a rule of law that the court is
considering. Further, judges may need to determine the relevance of a
study to a decision about the particular parties before the court.
4. ANALYTIC VALIDITY
Each of the methodological standards discussed thus far largely
concerns the design used to collect the empirical data for a social science
study of families or children. These standards are fundamental to good
social science; indeed they are fundamental for all science, because
high-quality data sets are a necessary condition for testing hypotheses
and theories that can be used to expand the scientific knowledge base of
the discipline. Even so, once the data for a study are collected, there
remains the task of analyzing the data with the goal of rigorously testing
the hypotheses that motivated the study.
Methods of analysis used in social science vary substantially
depending largely on the type of data that have been collected. The
techniques of statistical analysis used for experimental data, for exam-
ple, differ from those used for longitudinal survey data, which in turn
differ from those used to analyze ethnographic data. Hence social scien-
tists, indeed all scientists, are concerned in their work with a fourth type
of validity, analytic validity. Analytic validity refers to: (a) the appro-
priate match between the data to be analyzed and the technique(s) used
in the analysis, (b) the appropriate application of the techniques to the
data, and (c) the appropriate interpretation of the results of the analysis.
Judges assessing the scientific validity of social science research should
be attentive to issues of analytic validity because the use of inappropri-
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ate techniques, the misapplication of appropriate techniques, or the mis-
interpretation of technically correct results may result in biased or
misleading reports of results. In this subsection, we briefly illustrate
problems of analytic validity with two examples and then suggest how
problems of this sort may be identified without the courts themselves
becoming experts in statistical and other forms of analysis.
a. Statistical Significance
When testing for a relationship between two or more variables in a
sample-based data set, researchers typically report the level of statistical
significance of the relationship. Statistical significance simply refers to
a measure of the likelihood that the relationship between two or more
variables in a sample has occurred by chance (due to the use of the
random function to select the sample), rather than by the fact that the
relationship actually exists in the population. Put differently, statistical
significance tells the researcher the odds that a relationship among vari-
ables found in a sample data set is an artifact of studying a sample,
rather than studying an entire population.236 Two points are key in
assessing the use of significance tests in social science research. First, if
the study's sample was not selected randomly or if the randomness of
the sample has been seriously compromised, it is inappropriate to report
the levels of statistical significance for relationships among variables
found in the sample. For example, reporting the significance level of the
relationship between joint-physical custody arrangements and post-set-
tlement litigation in a nonrandom convenience sample of cases collected
at a mediation center would be inappropriate. Second, a corollary to the
first point is that the appropriate use of tests of statistical significance
has everything to do with whether the sample was randomly selected
and has relatively little to do with the size of the sample. Studies using
large nonrandom samples have no more legitimate call to use tests of
statistical significance than small convenience samples. 237
236. For general introductions to the concept of statistical significance and significance tests,
see LAWRENCE B. MOHR, UNDERSTANDING SIGNIFICANCE TESTING (Sage University Paper Series:
Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, No. 07-073, 1990); RAMON E. HENKEL, TESTS
OF SIGNIFICANCE (Eric M. Uslaner ed., Sage University Paper Series: Quantitative Applications in
the Social Sciences, No. 07-004, 1976).
237. A topic related to statistical significance is that of confidence levels and intervals. While
significance tests concern relationships between two or more variables, confidence levels assess
the likelihood of error and the degree of expected error when we use a single sample variable to
estimate a population variable. For example, if a researcher uses data from a national survey of
divorces to estimate the proportion of all divorce settlements that call for sole paternal custody, he
or she might say the following: I am 95% certain that 10.6% (+/- 2%) of all divorce settlements
call for paternal sole physical custody. The 95% figure is the confidence level, while the +/- 2%
figure is the confidence interval. In essence, the researcher is saying that if we believe that the
true proportion of divorces with paternal custody is between 8.6% and 12.6%, we will be correct
[Vol. 59:1
2004] SOCIAL SCIENCE KNOWLEDGE IN FAMILY LAW CASES 69
b. Specification of Models and Relationships
Depending on the type of information that researchers collect from
their research subjects, different methods are required for appropriate
analysis of the data. For example, producing a statistical model of rela-
tionships among variables that are rankings of a respondent's views,
such as levels of satisfaction with various terms of a divorce settlement
decree, requires an analytic technique that differs from what would be
used to model relationships among variables that are counts of respon-
dent's characteristics such as age, income, or child support payments.
Specifically, each of these types of data would require a different form
of a statistical modeling technique generically referred to as multivariate
regression analysis. 38 The key point here is that if a form of regression
analysis is misapplied to a particular type of data set, the resulting analy-
sis runs the risk of misestimating the underlying relationships in the
data. Regression analysis so commonly appears in social science and
other scientific information proffered to courts that the Federal Judicial
Center's Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence includes an entire
chapter on regression analysis.239
How then is a judge to know if the appropriate analytic techniques
have been applied to the data in a study presented to the court? At one
level, materials such as the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence are
available and provide highly useful overviews geared to legal audiences
on issues related to analytic validity. 4 ° However, it is also true that
analytic validity can be and frequently is a highly technical area requir-
95% of the time. For a study in which such an estimate is made, see Robert F. Kelly & William
Rinaman, The Structure and Prediction of Classes of Divorce Settlements Involving Dependent
Children in a National Sample, 38 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 1 (2003). What is key here is that
the use of confidence levels/intervals involves the same statistical reasoning as significance tests
and that each requires a randomly drawn sample in order to be validly employed.
238. For discussions of various types of regression analyses and their appropriate uses, see
LARRY D. SCHROEDER ET AL., UNDERSTANDING REGRESSION ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTORY
GUIDE (John L. Sullivan & Richard G. Niemi eds., Sage University Paper Series: Quantitative
Applications in the Social Sciences, No. 07-057, 1986); SCoTT MENARD, APPLIED LOGISTIC
REGRESSION ANALYSIS (Sage University Paper Series: Quantitative Applications in the Social
Sciences, No. 07-106, 2d ed. 2001); JOHN H. ALDRICH & FORREST D. NELSON, LINEAR
PROBABILITY, LoGrr, AND PROBIT MODELS (Sage University Paper Series: Quantitative
Applications in the Social Sciences, No. 07-045, 1984); MELISSA HARDY, REGRESSION WITH
DUMMY VARIABLES (1993).
239. See sources cited supra note 208.
240. See FRANK M. ANDREWS ET AL., A GUIDE FOR SELECTING STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES FOR
ANALYZING SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA (2d ed. 1981); HANDBOOK OF DATE ANALYSIS (Melissa Hardy
& Alan Bryman eds., 2004); GERALD VAN BELLE, STATISTICAL RULES OF THUMB (2002); PHILLIP
I. GOOD & JAMES W. HARDIN, COMMON ERRORS IN STATISTICS (AND How TO AVOID THEM)
(2003); and standard texts treating law and statistical analysis such as DAVID W. BARNES & JOHN
M. CONLEY, STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION: METHODOLOGY, PROCEDURE, AND PRACTICE
(1986).
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ing expertise that many judges simply will not have the time to develop
in the course of their careers. Ideally judges would have access to staff
or impartial experts who could assist in assessing the analysis. 241 As a
short-cut, however, judges could rely on the underlying quality-assur-
ance procedures of science, such as the peer-review process used by
scientific journals. Through these processes the scientific community
scrutinizes research reports on issues such as analytic validity. Specifi-
cally, we recommend that when questions of analytic validity arise, the
courts should inquire both whether the research in question was pub-
lished in a respected medium of scientific communication and to what
levels and degree of review the research was subjected prior to publica-
tion. In the next section, we provide a detailed discussion of these scien-
tific community social processes and ways in which the courts may rely
upon them.
C. The Social Practice of Science: Community Socialization,
Review, and Communication
The scientific method is constituted by the fundamental logic for
developing and testing hypotheses and theories242 and by a set of stan-
dards for the collection and analysis of empirical data 24 3 but there is a
third essential system that is key to the scientific method, namely the
social practices that together compose the scientific community. In this
section, we briefly describe three basic social practices that characterize
the scientific community, socialization, review, and communication, and
the relevance of these practices to judges assessing social science
research.
1. COMMUNITY SOCIALIZATION
Judges who assess social scientific research need to understand the
processes through which social scientists are socialized, because these
processes are among the most elemental in the scientific community's
efforts to regulate the quality of research. Social scientists with Ph.D.s
learn the logic and the standards of the scientific method in many ways.
Most commonly, they receive graduate training comprised of a combina-
tion of course work and supervised research. This training requires the
student-scientist to pass qualifying examinations prior to the beginning
241. Suggestions for aids to the Supreme Court have included social science special masters to
consider social science factual disputes and a national center that would assist the Court by
conducting needed research. See, e.g., Rustad & Koenig, supra note 111, at 159-61; see also
Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative and Administrative Lawmaking: A Proposed Research
Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REv. 1, 15 (1986).
242. See infra Part IV.A.
243. See infra Part IV.B.
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of dissertation research. Then there is the dissertation itself: a book-
length piece of original research that must be publicly defended and
approved by a committee of senior professors. Importantly, during their
graduate training social scientists intending to pursue careers involving
research will apprentice as research assistants on research projects head-
quartered at their graduate schools and led by senior professors. Further,
it is increasingly common for research-oriented social scientists to com-
plete post-doctoral fellowships for two or three years after they receive
their degrees. In these "post-docs," the professionally-young social sci-
entist may learn more specialized research skills, hold a leadership posi-
tion on a research project, and intensively pursue a specialized research
project alone or as a member of a team. While there is substantial varia-
tion in the prototypical training of a social scientist that we have
described schematically, there is also enough uniformity in the process
so that a judge faced with assessing a study produced by a social scien-
tist ought to be able to ascertain whether the researcher has in fact been
properly trained in the logic and methodological standards of the social
sciences.
It is also important to note that graduate social science training typ-
ically includes seminars that deal with professional behavior and the
code of ethics of the discipline.244 As related to the current discussion,
these codes include descriptions of problems associated with researcher
bias and how best to minimize its effect on the quality of research. For
example, when the research is submitted to a journal for publication,
such codes require the researcher to fully disclose funding sources for
the research project, the institutional affiliation of author, and potential
conflicts of interest. The goal of such mechanisms of transparency is to
reduce researcher bias.245 Hence, judges should be mindful that, like the
bar, each social science discipline operates with a code of ethics and that
each code provides standards that are used in the research review
process.
The professional socialization and training of social scientists do
not end with a Ph.D. or a post-doctoral fellowship, just as legal educa-
tion does not end with the granting of the J.D. and the passing of a bar
examination. Social scientists, like other scientists, continue training in
their substantive fields of specialization and their disciplines' methodol-
ogies by maintaining an active voice in their disciplines' scientific com-
244. See, e.g., AM. SOCIOLOGICAL Ass'N, CODE OF ETHICS AND POLICIES AND PROCEDURES OF
THE ASA COMMI1TrEE ON PROF'L ETHICS (1997).
245. Because human beings are the typical research subjects of social scientific research, social
scientists are bound by ethical codes governing the treatment of human subjects in research.
Training in such codes is typically part of graduate methodological training and journals typically
require that researchers have complied with their institution's human subject policies.
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munity. We discuss the nature of these communication practices below,
but in the context of our discussion of continuing social scientific train-
ing, it is important to note that the professional resum6 of the author or
co-author of a study may be examined for indications of the degree to
which the researcher has continued his or her professional training and
socialization. Such indications might include the following activities:
presenting research papers at professional meetings, publishing research
papers in peer-reviewed journals, reviewing papers for presentation at
professional meetings or for publication in journals, reviewing research
proposals for government and other funding organizations, and serving
on editorial and advisory boards. Again, as with graduate training, it
should be possible to ascertain from researchers' resum6s the degree to
which they have continued to train in their discipline. While indicators
of training and continuing education will not be sufficient in themselves
to determine the scientific merit of a piece of research proffered to the
court, they are clearly relevant and should be assessed with care.
2. COMMUNITY REVIEW
One of the distinguishing features of the scientific method and the
type of knowledge it produces is the intense review procedure through
which research reports must travel before and after formal communica-
tion of results to the discipline. Indeed, when scientists use the term
objectivity, they typically are not referring to the achievement of a state
of the absolute absence of bias, but rather to the degree to which
research reports have successfully undergone the process of critical
community review. More formally, objectivity is the process by which
the scientific community continuously scrutinizes the methodological
and theoretical merits of research results and explanations presented by
its members with the goal of reducing bias.24 6 Two key aspects of this
understanding of objectivity should be noted. First, the scientific com-
munity can never declare a research finding to be free of bias. Rather,
implicit declarations are made as to the degree to which findings have
been scrutinized for bias and the degree to which the findings have with-
stood this scrutiny. Second, objectivity is inherently a collective or
social process. It is the scientific community that produces objectivity,
not individual researchers.
A judge who is reviewing a social science study should inquire into
how rigorously the study was reviewed, because in doing so the judge is
inquiring into the objectivity of the research. It is precisely for this rea-
son, we believe, that the third question that the Supreme Court in
246. See, e.g., JOHN ZIMAN, RELIABLE KNOWLEDGE: AN EXPLORATION OF THE GROUNDS FOR
BELIEF IN SCIENCE, 107-09 (1978); Beyea & Berger, supra note 161, at 338.
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Daubert instructed judges to ask of information proffered as scientific is:
Has the scientific claim successfully passed peer review ?247 We next
turn our attention to describing this process.
The centerpiece of the process of scientific objectivity is pre-publi-
cation peer review. 48 Generally, peer review operates as follows. A
research report is submitted to a scientific journal for possible publica-
tion.24 9 The norm is that a paper may be under review only at a single
journal at a time, a norm that differs greatly from that typically followed
by law reviews in the United States, which allow authors to make multi-
ple, simultaneous submissions. After a preliminary review by the jour-
nal's editor, any indication of the author's identity and affiliation is
removed from the paper and copies are sent to reviewers who have
expertise in the areas covered by the paper. In this process of blind peer
review, there are typically three or more reviewers who are asked to
assess the paper for its scientific merit. In evaluating the research paper
and findings, reviewers are expected to employ the standards of the sci-
entific method that we have previously described. Specifically, they are
to determine whether the logic of scientific inquiry was followed in the
research.25 0 Reviewers then examine the merit of the work in terms of
methodological design and analysis standards, specifically examining
measurement validity and internal, external, and analytic validities. 51
Reviewers are also mindful of professional ethical standards252 in their
review, particularly as they relate to potential researcher bias and to the
protection of human subjects.
After the journal receives the reviews, a judgment is made on the
research report. Judgments generally fall into the following categories:
accept for publication; accept pending minor revisions; reject with an
invitation to undertake major revisions and then to resubmit for further
reconsideration; and reject. In the social sciences, most papers are either
rejected or given "revise and resubmit" decisions at this point. For
papers other than those rejected, editors will make the necessary inquir-
247. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
248. See FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 12, at 163-205.
249. Procedures similar to those described above are typically also used for papers submitted
to professional meetings for presentation or research proposals submitted to funding agencies,
although procedures do vary. The review process for research reports submitted as book
manuscripts is more difficult to describe. For university presses, the process is very similar to that
described in the text with respect to social science journals. For trade publishers, however, there
may be little if any scientific peer review with a greater emphasis placed on public appeal than
scientific merit. Hence, in assessing research presented in book form, judges need to be active in
ascertaining the exact nature of pre-publication review that has taken place.
250. See infra Part IV.A.
251. See infra Part IV.B.
252. See discussion of professional socialization infra Part IV.C. 1.
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ies related to professional ethics, such as those related to full disclosure
of funding sources. For authors who receive a revise and resubmit deci-
sion and who in fact do revise and resubmit, the process described above
continues until the paper is either acceptable or the determination is
made that it does not merit publication. Publication rates vary among
social science disciplines, but for lead journals published by professional
associations of social scientists, the annual acceptance rate is likely in
the range of ten to fifteen percent. 253
The conclusion that judges should unfailingly take from this discus-
sion is that it is essential to inquire as to whether any research under
consideration by the court has undergone peer review and, if so, the
exact nature of the peer review. Research that has been published after
thorough peer review should be given substantially greater weight than
that which has not.
Beyond peer review, other methods are used to enhance objectivity
in social science, two of which are particularly relevant to our analysis,
namely replication and public access to data for re-analysis. As a gen-
eral rule, peer reviewers and the scientific community give greater
credence to research findings that have been replicated than to those that
are reported for the first time. Replication generally means that
researchers have been able to reproduce the same result under the same
or very similar circumstances in separate studies.
Pure replication can be difficult to achieve in the social sciences
because most research is conducted in ongoing social systems rather
than highly controlled laboratory settings, where the conditions needed
for replication are relatively easy to achieve. Because social systems are
dynamic, it is difficult to meet the expectation inherent in replication:
that research conditions across replication studies will be the same or
very similar. For example, even if three studies of custody arrangements
in divorce settlements were conducted at the same time in California,
Wisconsin, and Michigan, they would not be pure replications of each
other because the laws regulating divorce in the three states would dif-
fer.2 54 These studies then at best would be quasi-replications. If they
produced similar results, the results would likely be given the enhanced
status of having been replicated in spite of the differences between the
253. To illustrate this point, we calculated the acceptance rate for the four lead journals of the
American Sociological Association in 1996. It was 11.5%. For important descriptions and
critiques of the peer-review process, see Elizabeth Knoll, The Communities of Scientists and
Journal Peer Review, 263 JAMA 1330 (1990); David F. Horribin, The Philosophical Basis of
Peer Review and the Suppression of Innovation, 263 JAMA 1438 (1990); Arnold S. Relman &
Marcia Angell, How Good is Peer Review?, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 827 (1989).
254. See Greer Litton Fox & Robert F. Kelly, Determinants of Child Custody Arrangements at
Divorce, 57 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 693 (1995).
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states. On the other hand, if the findings were not replicated across the
three studies, it would be difficult to draw strong inferences because
differences between the states in their legal systems or in other impor-
tant characteristics might plausibly account for the differences in the
study results.
In general then, replication in the social sciences operates in a
slower and much less efficient manner than in the natural sciences,
because the social sciences cannot rely upon laboratory controls to pro-
vide equivalent research settings for the replication of studies.2 55 None-
theless, judges assessing research findings should inquire as to whether
or not research findings before them have been replicated and the degree
to which the findings have been replicated. Findings that have been rep-
licated repeatedly should be given greater credence than those that have
not been replicated. As with peer review, this analysis of replication is
consistent with Daubert in which the Supreme Court requires judges
considering information proffered as scientific to inquire as to whether
the information has acquired widespread acceptance: the fourth Daubert
question. 6 Within the scientific community, one of the necessary con-
ditions for widespread acceptance of a finding is that it has been
replicated.
It is increasingly common in the social sciences to require research-
ers to make the data sets upon which their published analyses are based
available to other researchers for possible re-analysis.257 The agency
that originally funded the research, for example, may require the
researcher to make the data available as a condition of receiving the
grant. Family social science projects in which this was the case include
the National Survey of Families and Households, the National Survey of
Children, and Maccoby and Mnookin's Stanford Child Custody Study.
Journals may also require that researchers whose work is to be published
provide other researchers with access to their data sets at the time of
publication. This is often done by placing the data on a web site and
providing the web site's URL in a footnote to the article. Highly
regarded journals that have such a policy or have experimented with it
include Science, the premier journal of the American Academy for the
Advancement of Science, which publishes both natural and social sci-
ence research; Demography, the highly regarded journal of the Popula-
tion Association of America; and the American Political Science
Review, the lead journal of the American Political Science Association.
255. The major exception to this statement is psychology in which well-controlled lab-based
experiments are common and therefore replication is more likely to occur.
256. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
257. See generally Kenneth J. Meier, The Value of Replicating Social Science Research,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 7, 1997, at B7.
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The underlying rationale for making data publicly available is that
researchers who know that other researchers may reanalyze their data
will be more cautious in data collection, analysis, and reporting of
results.
In this regard, it should be noted that one of the most influential
social science studies on the impact 'of divorce reforms in the 1970s and
1980s in the United States, Lenore Weitzman's The Divorce Revolution,
was heavily criticized and many of its findings were cast into serious
doubt because, when reanalyzed, the data sets that Weitzman provided
to other researchers did not yield the same results as she reported in her
book.258 Given the increasingly common requirement that data be made
available to the scientific community, it would be wise for judges assess-
ing social science research to inquire whether the data sets upon which
research reports are based have been made available to the scientific
community. When the data sets have been made available, greater
credence should be lent to the research. 59
The description of standard, community-review procedures in the
social sciences that we have provided should not be interpreted as a
claim that biased or even fraudulent work goes unpublished. The history
of science tells us otherwise. Rather, the point we wish to make is that
the scientific community and its institutions have a strong commitment
to the process of auto-criticism and that this commitment distinguishes
the scientific community from many other social institutions. Further, it
is likely that this commitment to auto-criticism is one of the corner-
stones upon which the impressive historical progress of scientific knowl-
edge is built. Hence, judges reviewing social scientific research should
scrutinize it for distinguishing signs indicating that it has been thor-
oughly filtered by the review processes of science.26°
3. COMMUNITY COMMUNICATION
Once research reports are reviewed and found to merit the attention
of the scientific community, they must be communicated to the commu-
258. See LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985); Richard R. Peterson,
A Re-Evaluation of the Economic Consequences of Divorce, 61 AM. Soc. REV. 528 (1996);
Lenore J. Weitzman, The Economic Consequences of Divorce Are Still Unequal: Comment on
Peterson, 61 AM. Soc. REV. 537 (1996); Richard R. Peterson, Statistical Errors, Faulty
Conclusions, Misguided Policy: Reply to Weitzman, 61 AM. Soc. REV. 539 (1996).
259. Organizations such as SOCIOMETRICS collect important family data sets and make
them available in easy-to-analyze formats. See, e.g., Sociometrics "American Family Data
Archive," at http://www.socio.com; see also the University of Michigan's Inter-University
Consortium for Political and Social Research, at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu.
260. See Bauer, supra note 154, for a description of the scientific review process as a huge
knowledge filter.
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nity. This communication is also a cornerstone of scientific progress.
Community communication is fundamental because the systems and
problems that scientists seek to understand are large and complex,
resembling an immense jigsaw puzzle, and no one researcher or research
team could possibly work on the entire puzzle alone.2 6' Hence, the day-
to-day work of researchers typically focuses on mid-sized and smaller
problems or systems, that is, parts of the puzzle. Under these conditions,
the only hope for the scientific community as a whole to advance the
understanding of big systems and problems is for the researchers who
constitute the community to continuously communicate with each other.
It is precisely for this reason that scientific communication, typically
through journal articles, is so central to the enterprise of science.
Indeed, it has been argued credibly that the pace of scientific progress
did not accelerate in the modem era until the means of scientific com-
munication became more rapid.262
The recognition of the centrality of scientific communication has an
important implication for judges considering social scientific family
research. Research that has been published in social scientific journals
should be given greater credence not only because it has passed the scru-
tiny of the peer review process of journals, but also because the results
have been communicated to the broader scientific community and will
be tested with respect to its contribution to the larger puzzle-solving
enterprise. Research that is isolated from this essential communication
loop because it has not been published may represent interesting infor-
mation, but it is not scientific knowledge because it has not been inte-
grated into the essential practice of scientific communication. In many
ways the problem of such isolated research is analogous to a hypotheti-
cal situation in which an appeals court writes a precedent setting deci-
sion, but fails to communicate it to lower courts. Is such a decision,
however thoughtful and innovative, precedent? In this regard, it is nota-
ble that one of the major criticisms of the concept of parental alienation
syndrome (PAS) is that much of the work upon which it is based is self-
published and therefore out of the scientific communication loop.
Hence, the concept and its use in divorce-related research and clinical
practice lacks the credibility that would normally be attributed to con-
cepts that had undergone peer-review and succeeded in being published
in a scientific journal.263
Beyond research reports communicated in the form of journal arti-
261. We borrow the jigsaw puzzle metaphor from Michael Polyani, The Republic of Science:
Its Political and Economic Theory, 1 MINERVA 54 (1962).
262. See id.
263. See, e.g., Kelly & Johnston, supra note 213.
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cles, there is another type of scientific communication that bears directly
on the work of judges who must assess social science research, namely
the literature review. Periodically, journals and other publications such
as annual reviews of professional associations publish literature reviews
that seek to summarize the present state of knowledge in an area of
scientific research. For example, the Journal of Marriage and Family
produces a decade review in which the most important research pub-
lished in fundamental sub-fields of family studies over the past ten years
is synthesized in fifteen to twenty integrative articles. 26 Similarly, the
American Sociological Association produces an Annual Review in which
synthetic articles are commissioned in fundamental areas of sociological
research. 265 The goal of such articles is to present a holistic picture of
where knowledge stands in a particular field and to thereby provide
researchers with a summary of what is well-known and well-replicated,
what is less certain, and what crucial problems need to be addressed by
researchers. In short, literature reviews communicate to researchers the
current state of work on the jigsaw puzzle and, in so doing, the literature
review seeks to provide guidance for future work.
Literature reviews may be qualitative or quantitative in nature. In
the case of the former, a highly regarded researcher gathers the relevant
studies, summarizes them, and then produces an integrative statement
based on the researcher's judgment.2 66 Over recent decades researchers
have increasingly used quantitative methods to produce literature
reviews that may be categorized by the broad title of meta-analyses.
Meta-analyses gather all relevant studies on a topic, code the research on
multiple dimensions of its methodology, categorize key findings that are
comparable across studies, and then enter this information into statistical
models that assess whether hypothesized effects have been demonstrated
to exist.26 7 An important recent meta-analysis relevant to family law is
Bauserman's analysis of a large number of studies that assessed the
264. The JOURNAL OF MARRIAGE AND FAMILY is the research journal of the National
Conference of Family Relations, the largest association of family professionals in the United
States. For the two most recent decade reviews, see 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 873-1307 (2000)
and 52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 807-1172 (1990).
265. For a recent volume containing review articles on older children leaving home, the
consequences of divorce for children and stepfamilies in the United States, see 20 ANNUAL
REviEw OF SOCIOLOGY (John Hagan & Karen S. Cook eds., t994).
266. See Ramsey & Kelly, supra note 10, at 675-83.
267. For discussions of these methods, see MORTON Hur, How SCIENCE TAKES STOCK: THE
STORY OF META-ANALYSIS (1997); THE HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH SYNTHEsIs (Harris Cooper &
Larry V. Hedges eds., 1994); FREDRIC M. WOLF, META-ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE METHODS FOR
RESEARCH SYNTHESIS (Sage University Paper Series: Applications in the Social Sciences, No. 07-
059, 1986). For a discussion of the utility of meta-analysis for the legal system, see Jeremy A.
Blumenthal, Law and Social Science in the Twenty-First Century, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1,
38-46 (2002).
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impact of joint-custody arrangements on children. 68
The role of research literature reviews, whether qualitative or quan-
titative, in the process of scientific communication makes it plain that
the single research article, while important in its own terms, gains its
larger significance and ultimate scientific meaning only when placed in
the context of related work by other members of the scientific commu-
nity. This fact is important in the context of social science research
proffered to the courts. Judges should not rely on any single piece of
research in evaluating a social scientific issue or question, but rather
should, to the degree possible, supplement specific pieces of research
with literature reviews that provide context for specific research findings
presented to the court.2 6 9 It is in doing so that judges will be able to
assess the degree to which direct research claims and science-based
practice claims have achieved general acceptance. Recall that the fourth
inquiry that judges are required to pursue in considering research find-
ings or theory proffered to the court as scientific under Daubert con-
cerns the degree to which the research findings or theory have gained
general acceptance.27°
V. CONCLUSION
Social science research and theory may be used properly and profit-
ably by courts in their handling of family law cases. Our general con-
clusion in many ways follows Daubert in that we urge judges to
examine whether social science proffered to the court has been produced
in manners consistent with the scientific method. In Parts II and III we
developed typologies of the uses and sources of social science knowl-
edge claims that come to the courts (see Table 1). In Part IV, we sought
to provide a detailed map of questions and standards that judges may
employ in making such methodological assessments (see Table 2). In
this section, we offer concluding reflections on these themes and make
suggestions for how the judicial and social scientific communities might
better cooperate in the future.
First, the application of Daubert and its progeny is limited to expert
testimony. From our analysis, however, it should be clear that social
science research and theory come to the courts in additional forms, such
as briefs and judicial notice. We believe that all social science research
268. Bauserman, supra note 228.
269. Other illustrations of such reviews on topics relevant to family and child law include:
Kelly, supra note 202, on the effectiveness of family preservation and reunification programs, and
Paul Amato, The Consequences of Divorce for Adults and Children, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
1269 (2000), on the impact of divorce on children and parents.
270. In ways that are very similar to the literature review, the best graduate and undergraduate
textbooks perform a similar literature review function.
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and theory used by the courts in whatever form should be subjected to
the same level of scrutiny that we have articulated in Part IV. In this, we
clearly extend Daubert. We do so because we expect that the scrutiny of
all scientific claims entering a judicial proceeding is likely to enhance
procedural fairness and reduce the risk of unvalidated scientific claims
influencing the substantive outcomes of such proceedings.
Second, a practical question that arises from our analysis and our
proposal to extend Daubert concerns strategies for assisting the courts in
the task of scrutinizing the methodological validity of social science
research and theory. Specifically, beyond asking the questions and
applying the standards outlined in Part IV, what can judges do to
improve their use of social science short of becoming social scientists
themselves? We have two suggestions that we believe will be helpful in
this regard.
One suggestion is that the family law judiciary should better com-
municate its research needs in a systematic and regular manner to social
scientists. Left to their own devices, social scientists select topics for
research that interest them and then conduct research on these topics in
accord with their discipline's framing of the topic. The research that
results, however, may not address relevant legal questions faced by
judges. To provide for better communication between the judiciary and
social scientists, committees of judicial or other legal associations
should work with social scientists to formulate research questions that
derive explicitly from the experience of judges and reflect the judges'
needs. Research questions could then be forwarded to social science
professional associations for publication. They might also be forwarded
to governmental agencies and foundations with research funding func-
tions with the expectation that the lists would influence research funding
priorities.
Another suggestion is that courts should consider commissioning
nonpartisan research organizations to produce research reviews summa-
rizing the state of current research on social science topics that regularly
come before the courts, especially the topics about which there is doubt
concerning conclusions that may be validly drawn from the literature. In
conducting such reviews, the staff of the research organization could be
instructed to explicitly address the key issues in Daubert as we have
outlined them in Part IV. Such reviews would go a long way toward
assisting judges in objective assessments of social science research.27'
271. Many not-for-profit, nonpartisan research organizations already release research reviews
relevant to family law matters on a regular basis. Illustrations include: the Child Trends Research
Brief series (http://www.childtrends.org), the Board on Children Youth and Families of the
National Academies (http://www.bocyf.org), and the journal, The Future of Children, published
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Third, judges need to keep in mind that social science cannot pro-
vide complete answers to the difficult questions they confront every day.
There are basic tensions between social science knowledge and judicial
decision-making. Social scientists study populations or classes of peo-
ple (or samples thereof) and their studies typically allow for inferences
only at the aggregate level, not at an individual level. Trial judges, how-
ever, need to decide cases involving specific individuals. This problem
is exacerbated by the fact that judges deciding family matters frequently
need to make a decision based on a prediction of what will happen in the
future to these individuals. In using social science, the judge cannot
treat a social science finding like a rule of law and apply it to an individ-
ual. Instead, the judge must determine the extent to which the character-
istics of the -population studied might be relevant to the case to be
decided and what normative values are relevant as well.
The new gate-keeping role of judges provides many challenges,
particularly in the family law area, because family law jurisprudence is
increasingly influenced by social science. Judges need to be knowledge-
able consumers of social science research, so that they can critically
assess not only expert testimony, but also briefs, training programs,
books, and other judicially noticed materials that they consider in law
formation and adjudication. We are cautiously optimistic that a mutu-
ally critical and profitable relationship can be forged between judges and
social scientists and that families will be the better for it.
by the Center for the Future of Children of the David and Lucile Packard Foundation (http://www.
futureofchildren.org). The courts might also develop cooperative networks with relevant
professional organizations and universities to handle requests for literature reviews.
